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Abstract: 
This accumulative dissertation, composed of six 
academic papers, contributes to the understanding of 
the impact investing ecosystem. The major part of 
the studies focuses on social and development 
impact bonds in different parts of the world (Europe, 
USA, Asia and Latin America). A second emphasis 
lies on the informal economy in Colombia and 
possible political/economic solutions through impact 
investing, e.g. microfinance. 
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Abstrakt: 
 
Diese kumulative Dissertation, bestehend aus sechs 
Artikeln, untersucht die diversen Aspekte des impact 
investing ecosystems. Der Großteil der Studien 
befasst sich mit social und development impact 
bonds in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt (Europa, 
USA, Asien und Lateinamerika). Ein weiterer Fokus 
liegt auf dem informellen Sektor in Kolumbien und 
mögliche politische/wirtschaftliche Lösungen durch 
impact investing, z.B. Mikrofinanz. 
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Introduction 
Impact investing has the potential to create market-
based solutions for social and environmental 
challenges across the globe. The basic idea of 
impact investing – a term coined in 2007 by the 
Rockefeller Foundation – is that an investment 
creates measurable positive social and/or 
environmental change in addition to a financial return 
(Bugg-Levine et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2014; Harji & 
Jackson, 2012). In this context, the innovation of this 
emerging investment market is not only the 
combination of financial and social returns on 
investment, but the measurement of the generated 
impact. Impact investing can be regarded as an 
evolution from other positive investment classes, 
such as socially responsible investments (SRI) or 
ethical investments which focus on high levels of 
environmental, social and governance factors (ESG) 
(Scarlata & Alemany, 2010). It offers a wide range of 
investment opportunities, such as debt, equity, 
microfinance funds, venture philanthropy or hybrid 
capital (Ormiston et al., 2015). The market 
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capitalization of the impact investing market is 
estimated between USD 107.2 billion (GSIA, 2016) 
and USD 101.4 billion (GIIN, 2017), which is still 
below JP Morgan's expectation to absorb between 
USD 400 billion and USD 1 trillion by 2020 
(O'Donohoe et al., 2010). However, impact investing 
has shown a fast growth (GSIA, 2016). 
Social impact bonds (SIBs) are one of the most 
promoted instruments of the impact investing market. 
The SIB model comprises three main stakeholders – 
private investors, the government and social service 
providers – who agree on the terms and conditions 
of the implementation of social programs with defined 
outcomes. This results in a tendency towards a data-
based approach and data-driven policy-making by 
the government. Development impact bonds (DIBs) 
differ from the SIB model in that the outcome payer 
of a successful social project is not the government, 
but a private organization. The first DIB was 
implemented in India in 2015.  
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The principle of targeted intervention programs with 
a measurable impact on society or the environment 
can be applied on a global level and offers a solution 
to problems the government alone cannot address 
adequately due to limited financial resources and 
rigid public policy strategies. In total, there are 89 
impact bonds implemented which raised USD 322 
million (Social Finance UK, 2017). However, the 
major share of the impact investing market is based 
in Europe and North America (Jackson, 2013). This 
thesis presents an extensive literature research on 
the emergence of the impact investing market and 
especially SIBs in the U.K. as well as their adoption 
and development in Germany and the United States. 
Furthermore, it explores the opportunities and 
challenges of impact investing in the Asian region, 
especially Japan and Singapore, and the 
implementation of SIBs and DIBs in the three Latin 
American countries Mexico, Colombia and Chile. The 
methodological approaches include a proposed 
impact investing ecosystem framework and the 
policy transfer approach by Benson (2009).  
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Moreover, this study examines the urban informal 
economy and street vending in Colombia, a particular 
socioeconomic problem, where the impact investing 
market can provide a solution. The methodology 
includes several questionnaire surveys that deliver 
primary data on the financial status and business 
practices of street vendors. These surveys can not 
only be used to analyze the underlying causes of 
poverty among people at the bottom of the social 
pyramid, but also as an assessment tool for the 
impact of an intervention. 
This thesis comprises five papers and one data 
article. Earlier versions of most of the papers have 
been presented at international conferences. 
The first paper entitled “The Emergence of Social 
Impact Bonds in England and its Adaptation in USA 
and Germany” was presented at the ECPR General 
Conference 2015 in Montréal, Canada under the 
original title “Market-based Solutions for Social 
Challenges: A Collaborative Policy Making Strategy”. 
Furthermore, it was published via the research gate 
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in 2015, where it has been downloaded over 400 
times already. The paper examines the origin and 
development of the impact investing market in the 
U.K., with a special focus on one of its most promoted 
instruments: social impact bonds. Furthermore, it 
explains the multi-stakeholder concept of SIBs to 
face increasing social challenges and highlights the 
associated risks and opportunities for the 
government. Three case studies are used to 
demonstrate how SIBs have been adopted and 
adapted by different governments, namely the U.K., 
the U.S. and Germany. Following the basic principle 
of impact investing, SIBs are designed to create both 
financial and social impact. The paper points out that 
the offered social service programs target a specific 
problem in society or the environment and tend to be 
preventative instead of reactive, focusing on long-
term effects. However, the real innovation is that the 
achieved impact of these programs has to be 
measured, which allows for data-driven policy 
making. The conclusion is that SIBs promote social 
change through long-term, outcome-based 
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prevention programs, while also gaining a financial 
return. 
The second paper with the title “A Proposed 
Framework to Analyze the Impact Investing 
Ecosystem in a Cross-Country Perspective” was 
written in collaboration with Min-ni Wu from the Willy 
Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of 
Erfurt, Germany. It was presented under the title “The 
Impact Investing Ecosystem in Japan and 
Singapore“ at the 24th International Scientific 
Conference on Economic and Social Development - 
"Managerial Issues in Modern Business" in Warsaw 
on October 13th and 14th 2017. This paper focuses 
on the assessment of the impact investing 
ecosystem on a national level and in a cross-country 
perspective. For this purpose, an innovative 
framework has been developed. The proposed 
assessment tool is based on an entrepreneurial 
ecosystem approach (Babson Entrepreneurship 
Ecosystem Approach) and adapted to the Social 
Impact Investment Framework by the OECD. The 
resulting “impact investing ecosystem framework” 
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complements the analytical approaches of the two 
previous methods and combines the most suitable 
sets of parameters to evaluate the essential aspects 
of the impact investing market. This new framework 
is then applied to examine the challenges and 
possibilities of the expansion of the impact investing 
market in the Asian region, where the concept is still 
relatively new and the academic research on the 
topic is limited. Japan and Singapore are used as 
case studies and compared with the U.K. as a 
reference for impact investing practices. The results 
show that both Japan and Singapore would benefit 
from impact investing, though in different aspects, 
and that they have generally enabling environments 
for the development of its market. Taking into 
account the elementary role of public policies in this 
process, the paper concludes with individual policy 
recommendations for each country. The core 
message is that the developed impact investing 
ecosystem framework can be used to identify and 
influence every determinant of the impact investing 
8 
 
ecosystem and as a way to catalyze the growth of the 
market. 
The third paper with the title “Impact Bonds in the 
Latin American Context: Policy Transfer Analysis for 
Mexico, Chile and Colombia” was written in 
collaboration with Luis Angel Tellez Live from the 
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University 
of Erfurt, Germany. It was presented at on Oct 20, 
2016, at the 17th International Scientific Conference 
on Economic and Social Development: Managerial 
Issues in Modern Business, Warsaw, Poland and 
published at TARGET – Universität Erfurt on January 
3rd, 2017. The paper examines the market for social 
impact bonds (SIBs) and development impact bonds 
(DIBs) in Mexico, Chile and Colombia, where first 
pilot projects have already been designed, but not yet 
implemented at the time of research. Using the policy 
transfer approach by Benson (2009), this study 
identifies and analyzes the distinct constraints that 
hinder the adoption of impact bonds in the three pilot 
countries in Latin America. Furthermore, the paper 
gives an overview of the characteristics of the SIB 
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and DIB models. The results of the comprehensive 
analysis show that the major obstacles for the impact 
bonds market in the three Latin American countries 
are the politicization by interest groups in Mexico, 
political cycles in Colombia, and the level of the 
government’s centralization in Chile. The conclusion 
is that the identified constraints should be addressed 
adequately by the local policy makers and that a 
more insistent promotion of both SIBs and DIBs is 
recommended. 
The fourth paper entitled “Debt Portfolios of the Poor: 
The Case of Street Vendors in Cali, Colombia” has 
been elaborated in collaboration with Lina Martinez, 
director of the Observatory of Public Policy - POLIS 
at the Universidad Icesi in Cali, Colombia. It was 
presented at the SGEM International Conferences on 
Social Sciences on March 2017 in Vienna. As well as 
at the “19th International Conference on Population 
and Development” in Paris 2017. This paper has 
been sent for revision at the journal “Sustainable 
Cities and Society” on October 4th, 2017. The paper 
investigates the urban informal economy in Cali, the 
10 
 
third most populous city in Colombia, with a focus on 
street vending. Based on the results of two 
questionnaire surveys carried out between 2014 and 
2016, it examines the socioeconomic background 
and the debt portfolio of street vendors at two distinct 
vending sites. The results show that street vendors 
usually belong to socially and economically 
vulnerable population groups at the bottom of the 
social pyramid who are excluded from the formal 
banking system. The study also finds that they earn 
a higher income than the average working age 
citizen, but lose most of their earnings due to high 
interest rates of payday-loans offered by loan sharks. 
This creates a vicious circle of indebtedness and 
poverty. The conclusion is that access to regulated 
financial structures with fair credit options can be an 
effective policy strategy to reduce poverty among 
street vendors and increase their quality of life. The 
introduction of the impact investing market in 
Colombia, and especially the promotion of SIBs, can 
offer the necessary capital and mechanisms to target 
this problem. 
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The fifth paper entitled “Debt portfolios of the poor: 
Survey Data from Street Vendors in Cali, Colombia” 
presents the database of a questionnaire survey with 
68 questions on indebtedness and access to credit 
institutions. The survey was carried out on 300 
randomly selected street vendors at two street 
vending sites in Cali, Colombia in 2016. The data 
article outlines all the relevant background 
information about the urban informal economy in 
Colombia, the methodology of the survey and the 
gathered data. It has been sent for revision to the 
journal “Data in Brief” on November 11th, 2017. 
The sixth and final paper of this study is titled “A 
Proposed Credit Risk Assessment for People at the 
Bottom of the Social Pyramid in Cali, Colombia” and 
was also written in collaboration with Lina Martinez 
from the Universidad ICESI in Cali, Colombia. It 
proposes a questionnaire survey with 62 questions 
on quality of life, financial status and indebtedness. 
This survey can be used as a tool to assess the 
individual credit risk among poor people in Colombia 
and reduce information asymmetries. The goal is to 
12 
 
incentivize the financial inclusion of the poor, which 
in turn can reduce poverty and increase the quality of 
life. Furthermore, the assessment tool can be used 
by the government or impact investors to develop 
outcome-based intervention programs. 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
 
13 
 
The Emergence of Social 
Impact Bonds in England 
and its Adaptation in USA 
and Germany1 
Juan David Rivera Acevedo2 
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) 
and their potential to align the interests of social 
entrepreneurs, the government, and financial 
markets in a collaborative policy-making strategy. It 
focuses on the emergence of the social investment 
market in the U.K., the key stakeholders in an SIB 
                                                             
1 An early version of this paper was presented at the ECPR General 
Conference 2015 in Montreal, Canada by the name “Market-based 
Solutions for Social Challenges: A Collaborative Policy Making 
Strategy” and Published at Research Gate on Aug 2015. Over 400 
times downloaded and commented by experts. 
DOI10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203  
2 Lecturer Brandt School of Public Policy. PhD Candidate Center for 
Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Sciences (CEREB) 
University of Erfurt, Germany. juan_david.rivera_acevedo@uni-
erfurt.de 
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and the risk and opportunities for the government in 
the model. It also examines how SIBs have been 
adopted by the U.S. and Germany. The conclusion 
is that SIBs promote social change through long-
term, outcome-based prevention programs, while 
also gaining a financial return. Nevertheless, the 
level of profit-orientation is determined by the path-
dependency of the respective governmental 
institutions. 
 
Keywords:  Data-Based Policy-Making, Impact 
Investing, Public Policy, Pay for Success Contracts, 
Social Impact Bonds. 
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I. Introduction 
Cities and states around the world are facing 
increasing budgetary deficits and are often 
overwhelmed with the financial burden associated 
with social issues. The political cost to  allocate 
public funds to solve these problems is especially 
high because social programs do not guarantee 
success in the elective term. This causes a rigidity 
in the public budgets. Most of the social programs 
supported by the government tend to be reactive 
instead of preventive, which results in high 
expenses with only few effects in the long term. For 
example, public policies to address an issue like 
homelessness mostly provide support services that 
mitigate the consequences of homelessness. In this 
case, the emerging expenses, such as temporary 
shelters, public medical services, police or human 
resources absorb funds from other social programs 
that actually target the cause of the problem. 
Meanwhile, several social sector organizations 
provide innovative, preventative programs. 
However, to scale upwards, these interventions 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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require greater cash-flow stability than current 
philanthropy provides, leaving the burden on the 
government to identify and expand such programs. 
This distortion between innovative social service 
providers and government risk-aversion prevents 
vulnerable populations from receiving the critical 
services they need. 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) are meant to solve the 
above-mentioned distortion by bringing together 
private investors and social service providers in the 
design and implementation of prevention programs 
that target the underlying causes of specific social 
problems. The SIB model emerged in the U.K. and 
has been adopted by different nations such as the 
U.S., Germany, Australia and the Netherlands. This 
paper uses a case approach in order to study how 
the model has been integrated into the respective 
economic, social and political systems, and how this 
adaptation has affected its performance in 
achieving social outcomes along with a financial 
return. 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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The first section of this paper analyzes the 
emergence of social investment and the SIB model 
in England. The second section assesses specific 
cases of SIBs in the U.K. and in the early adopter 
countries, U.S. and Germany, in order to determine 
the differences in the adaptation of SIBs as a public 
policy instrument. The third section presents the 
risks and opportunities that the SIB model implies 
for the government in the selected cases. The fourth 
section presents the conclusions. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
a. The Emergence of Social Investment in 
England 
During the past decades, numerous countries have 
experienced structural changes concerning their role 
to deliver services to their citizens. These changes 
have been characterized by a predilection for market 
deregulation, which prioritized tax reduction and 
privatization over centralized models of welfare state 
(Edwards, 2011, 2012). Approaches such as “New 
Public Management” (Hood, 1991) or “Reinventing 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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Government” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993) intended to 
transform the state into an entity that is capable of 
achieving the same levels of productivity and 
efficiency as a best-run private company. 
This makeover, driven by a “more efficient use of 
scarce public resources”, encouraged market-based 
models of welfare delivery, which led to the 
introduction of  tendering processes in areas that 
used to be state responsibilities (McHugh et al., 
2013). In this context, the so called “third sector” 
delivered welfare goods and services, and showed 
an exponential growth (Allen, 2009; Millar, 2012). 
The “third sector” is hard to define due to its diverse 
organizational structure and wide-ranging purposes. 
The third sector is usually defined as the combination 
of different social sector organizations, which are 
non-profitable and self-governing, remain 
institutionally separate from the state and receive 
voluntary member contributions (Phillips & Hebb, 
2010; Salamon et al., 1999). However, this definition 
rejects the fact that the third sector can also be profit-
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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oriented. As seen in figure 1, and for the purpose of 
this research, this sector is identified as an 
intermediary between the public and private sector, 
with the capability to be both for-profit and not-for-
profit (Kenny, 2013; Pestoff, 1992). 
Figure 1: Pestoff Triangle  
 
(Source: Pestoff, 1992) 
Changes concerning the funding of third sector 
organizations reshaped their strategies. 
Traditionally, philanthropic donations, charitable 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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foundations and government grants provided one-
way finance to social sector organizations (Kingston 
& Bolton, 2004). In Western Europe, the allocation of 
public resources was transformed towards contracts 
and payments. In the U.S., public grants were heavily 
reduced while the commercial income of the third 
sector simultaneously increased (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2010a).  
The transformation of some third sector 
organizations into business-like entities created the 
potential for new revenues and investment streams. 
This new investment niche emerged as “social 
investment”3, which can be traced back to policy 
makers in the U.S. and the U.K. in the 1990s 
(Benjamin et al., 2004). This movement started in the 
UK in 1997, when Community Development Finance 
Institutions (CDFIs), such as the  “Phoenix Fund 
Services”, were encouraged to direct significant 
                                                             
3The term social investment refers to a monetary investment in a social 
policy initiative, providing the investor a “double bottom line” with 
financial return while still delivering public welfare services (Alter, 2000; 
Emerson, 2003; Grant, 2012; Kingston & Bolton, 2004; Manetti, 2014) 
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investment funds towards the third sector in order to 
promote community development and cover a 
market that had been uncharted by conventional 
financial institutions (Kneiding and Tracey, 2008). 
Under the Labor Party in 2000, the U.K. government 
extended the CDFIs’ movement and funded the 
Social Investment Task Force (SITF). The SITF was 
an advisory body to the U.K. government from 2000 
to 2010 and was chaired by Sir Ronald Cohen, a 
traditional venture capitalist. The aim of the SITF was 
to enhance economic regeneration by generating 
novel sources of private or institutional investment for 
entrepreneurial practices where the voluntary sector, 
businesses and government could play as partners 
(SITF, 2000). In the same way, the Council on Social 
Action was created with the aim to bring together 
innovators from the different sectors to generate 
ideas for communal development. It was in this 
council that the initial idea to link the outcome of 
social programs with financial returns emerged 
(Cabinet Office UK, 2007; Nicholls & Tomkinson, 
2013). 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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During the 2007 bank debt crisis, many 
governments, including the U.K., decided to address 
the recession by introducing major austerity 
programs. In this context, the third sector had the 
opportunity to expand within the public sector 
(Manville & Broad, 2013; Phillips & Hebb, 2010; 
Smith, 2010). In the same year, the SITF 
successfully lobbied for legislation and enabled the 
liberation of £250m of liquid finance from dormant 
accounts in the U.K.; in July 2011, it set up the launch 
of Big Society Capital to support the development of 
a sustainable social investment market (Big Society 
Capital, 2012; Cabinet Office UK, 2014). The idea of 
data-based policy-making along with new sources of 
direct investment became very attractive and gained 
political momentum. 
The approval of this development was strengthened 
by the emergence of impact investing. The term 
“impact investing” was coined in 2007 as the 
Rockefeller Foundation launched an initiative to build 
up a “worldwide industry” where investments do not 
only seek for financial returns but also for social and 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
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environmental impacts (Harji & Jackson, 2012, p. 1). 
These investments, adopting both non-profit and for-
profit instruments, supplemented traditional 
philanthropic donations and government grants to 
foster social progress (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 
2011). 
In 2010, British Prime Minister David Cameron 
introduced the ideology of the “Big Society” as his 
cornerstone policy to target the establishment of a 
social investment market (Cabinet Office UK, 2014; 
Harris, 2011). In that same year, Social Finance, a 
not-for-profit organization, launched the first Social 
Impact Bond (SIB) in Britain. The organization signed 
a contract with the U.K. Ministry of Justice to reduce 
prison recidivism rates in Peterborough, a prison 
outside London with a history of high recidivism 
(Shufelt, 2012). To fund the program, Social Finance 
raised £5m from 17 different social investors, who 
would make a profit of up to 13% of their investment, 
but only if the recidivism rate dropped by more than 
7.5% within six years. 
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Since Peterborough, the SIB concept expanded 
across the world and garnered support from 
numerous political parties and countries, including 
the U.S and Germany. During the G8 Summit in 
Enniskillen in June 2013, David Cameron called 
upon the different governments, social actors and the 
private sector to “evaluate the potential and 
practicalities of social investing as an innovation 
catalyzer that could help unravel some of society’s 
most pressing issues”, and established the Social 
Impact Investing Task Force (SIITF) (SIITF, 2014). 
Even though the social investment market is still in 
early stages, it has achieved international 
acceptance by governments around the world which 
are using, or are planning to use it in addition to their 
traditional social policies. 
b. Understanding Social Impact Bonds 
Based on the desire to reduce a social problem, e.g. 
homelessness or prison recidivism, a partnership 
between social service providers, government, 
investors and an intermediary is formed to agree on 
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an investment structure, including the desired 
program outcomes (e.g. a drop of at least 10% of the 
prison recidivism rate). Once the targets are set and 
a credible counterfactual4 is formulated, private 
investors provide the upfront capital to the service 
providers to scale up the program. This capital 
secures the delivery of the intervention to service 
users, regardless the targeted outcomes. During and 
after program implementation, independent 
validators conduct rigorous tests to assess whether 
the targeted outcomes have been achieved or not. 
Depending on these evaluations, the government 
pays back the investors the principal plus a rate of 
return. This means that if the targeted outcome 
cannot be achieved, the government does not pay 
and the investors lose out on their capital. However, 
if the outcome is positive, the government pays back 
the investors, but is still expected to save resources, 
for example through a lower demand for beds in 
prison or homeless shelters. Indirectly, these 
                                                             
4An estimate of what outcomes would have been achieved without the 
intervention. 
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reduced expenses could be used to repay, at least in 
part, the SIB. Furthermore, the entire society profits 
from the achieved positive externalities, such as 
more security or less poverty (see figure 2). 
Figure 2: General structure of a SIB 
 
(Source: author) 
The concept of connecting measurable positive 
social impact with financial returns is a simple idea 
with significant implications for society as it creates 
enormous market opportunities and enables social 
innovation in local communities. Social Impact Bonds 
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(SIBs) are among the newest financial instruments5 
in the impact investment market. SIBs attract capital 
to tackle social challenges, creating shared value for 
the government, investors and non-profit service 
providers through a multi-stakeholder partnership 
(McKinsey & Company, 2012; World Economic 
Forum, 2013). In theory, this instrument enables the 
government to deliver better outcomes at a lower 
cost without jeopardizing taxpayers’ resources. The 
investors experience a double bottom line gain as 
they receive a reasonable financial return for their 
investment, but also a social profit (Palandjian & 
Schaeffer, 2014). Furthermore, SIBs promote 
preventative interventions rather than reactive 
programs. Finally, the non-profit service providers 
gain scale capital to grow their business while 
benefiting underserved communities and individuals 
(Eccles, 2014). 
                                                             
5SIBs behave like equity products which pay out financial returns only 
if the expected outcomes were met, in contrast to a traditional financial 
bond where the holder receives a fix interest rate until maturity. 
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Traditional procurement processes and grants 
require social service providers to be accountable 
for certain inputs and outputs of their programs. 
However, there is no focus on the outcome6, e.g. the 
effect on the lives of the service users. One of the 
most important innovations of the SIB model is the 
aspect of contracting by outcomes. That way, the 
social service providers can be held accountable 
for the real social value their programs created. 
Another main characteristic of SIBs is the 
collaboration of the different stakeholders 
(government, social service providers, investors, 
service users and evaluators) in the design and 
implementation of outcome-oriented prevention 
programs. 
 
                                                             
6Understanding the difference between inputs, outputs and outcomes 
is easier with an example: Imagine you were in a hospital. The inputs 
are the number of doctors, the output they provide is the number of 
operations, whereas the expected outcome is the overall improvement 
in health of the patients.  
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In theory, governments could save more money if 
they directly borrowed from the capital markets at 
lower interest rates and invested in prevention 
programs. However, the political risk associated 
with the investment of public funds in programs that 
might fail is very high because of the potential 
accusation of wasting taxpayers’ resources. This is 
one of the reasons why it is not common for 
governments to make direct investments in 
innovative models of social service delivery. 
SIBs present a good opportunity for the government 
to promote innovation. According to the SIB model, 
government resources only come into play if there 
is evidence that the SIB-financed services 
accomplished the expected social outcome, which 
means that the financial risk is transferred to the 
private investors7. Government commissioners 
have the incentive and obligation to meet the 
expectations of their electorate concerning social 
                                                             
7In the case of the Newpin Social Benefit Bond (same as SIB) in New 
South Wales, Australia, the government would repay part of the private 
investment even if no positive outcomes are achieved. 
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improvement and an increase in quality of life. SIBs 
offer the government the opportunity to channel 
private investments for this purpose, and gradually 
shift the use of state resources from reactive to 
prevention programs. The overall goal is to reduce 
social problems in the long term and in a cost-
effective way. 
III. Methodology and Cases 
In this study, a case approach was used. The original 
SIB model from the U.K. has been adopted and 
adapted by different nations around the world. By the 
time of this research, the U.S., Germany, Australia 
and the Netherlands have had at least one 
operational SIB. In order to study how existing SIBs 
work in the real world, the evolution of specific cases 
was examined and provides insight into how 
economics, politics and institutions affect the 
potential and performance of SIBs to achieve social 
outcomes. However, the inevitable risk of case 
studies is that the selection of cases could be 
unrepresentative, and that the derived standards are 
too generalized and biased. This paper studies three 
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SIBs, which are set in different countries and 
therefore belong to different political, economic and 
cultural backgrounds. The basic criteria for selecting 
these cases was access to reliable data. The 
purpose of this study is to contribute to the 
understanding of SIBs and their adaptation as a 
public policy instrument in different national settings. 
The cases studied include the Ambition East 
Midlands partnership for young homeless people in 
Britain, the Salt Lake City high quality pre-school 
program for economically disadvantaged children in 
the U.S. and the pilot SIB project in Augsburg, 
Germany, which was designed to help 
disadvantaged adolescents find employment and 
apprenticeship opportunities. 
a. Britain 
The U.K. has been the pioneer in the development 
of social impact bonds and the social investment 
market. However, as displayed in figure 3, there 
have been several key innovations since the launch 
of the first SIB. 
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Figure 3: Key developments in the social impact 
investment market in the UK 
 
(Source: NAB UK, 2014) 
The first SIB was developed under the premise of 
creating social benefit and reducing state expenses 
at the same time. It was grounded on a data-based 
calculation of the costs of a defined social problem. 
To be specific, in Britain, a youth offender costs the 
state around $34,600 (£21,268) per year, while a 
data-based intervention designed to prevent 
reoffending costs around $11,400 (£7,000) (Cabinet 
Office UK, 2014c). Knowing the true cost of a 
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specific social outcome could provide incentives to 
social service providers to develop interventions 
that are capable of achieving the same or better 
outcomes at lower expenses (Eccles, 2014a). 
Hence, one important innovation was the creation of 
the Unit Cost Database in 2014, which calculates 
the price of negative outcomes for the government, 
and promotes a more effective measurement and 
analysis process of the social service delivery. 
Another significant innovation was the Social 
Investment Tax Relief (SITR) regulation in 2014, 
which encourages individuals to support social 
enterprises through tax reliefs. Individuals, who 
invest in organizations with a defined and regulated 
social purpose8, can deduct 30% of the cost of 
their investment from their income tax liability. 
Individual investors can invest up to £1m per social 
                                                             
8Other eligible organizations include charities, community interest 
companies or community benefit societies delivering qualifying 
trade, fewer than 500 employees, and gross assets of no more 
than £15m (Cabinet Office UK, 2015). 
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enterprise. (Cabinet Office UK, 2015) 
Furthermore, the British government established 
the Fair Chance Fund (FCF) in 2014 as part of the 
Department for Communities & Local Government 
(DCLG) and the Cabinet Office, which 
commissions Payment by Results (PBR) contracts. 
The FCF addresses some of the key issues 
contributing to homelessness amongst 18-24 year-
olds. A total funding of £15m has been allocated by 
the DCLG for front line organizations to support this 
target group with accommodation, education, 
training and employment over a three-year  period 
(Cabinet Office UK, 2014a). 
Ambition East Midlands (AEM) was the first Social 
Impact Bond to benefit from the Unit Cost 
Database, the Social Investment Tax Relief and the 
Fair Chance Fund. The AEM consortium is formed 
by P3 Charity, YMCA Derbyshire, and the Y. Their 
aim is the improvement of accommodation and 
employment options for young homeless people, 
who are neglected by existing services. Since this 
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target group often falls through the social safety net 
due to the complex and interlinking problems they 
experience, they receive insufficient support, 
resulting in a high risk of getting involved in crime, 
substance abuse or long term benefit dependency 
(Big Issue Invest, 2015). AEM believes that these 
young adults deserve a fair chance, and that with 
the right support everyone can play a positive part 
in their communities and live fulfilling lives. 
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Figure 4: Structure of Ambition East Midlands SIB 
 
(Source: author) 
On behalf of the UK government, the AEM SIB 
was signed between the DCLG, the Cabinet Office 
and the AEM consortium for a three year period 
(January 2015 to January 2018). The awarded 
maximum contract value is £2.95m as part of the 
FCF program. Triodos Bank was commissioned 
with the performance management for the first six 
months of the contract, until full operational 
capability of the consortium. This administrative role 
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includes ensuring that the SPV9 is set up correctly, 
processing the claims for outcome payments, and 
creating the reporting structure for investors in order 
to ensure that cohort recruitment and delivery is on 
track. However, the idea is to build capabilities 
among social service providers to contract SIBs in 
the future, without the need of an intermediary. The 
managing board of the AEM SIB includes three 
provider representatives, an independent chair 
and two investor representatives (see figure 4). 
The social service providers divided the 
corresponding geographic area to improve the 
service: P3 works in Derbyshire, YMCA Derbyshire 
works in Derby City and the Y works in 
Leicestershire and Leicester City. Together they 
offer innovative and intensive support for 340 of the 
most vulnerable young homeless people across 
                                                             
9“A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is a legal entity that is created 
solely for a particular financial transaction or to fulfill specific 
objectives. Investors’ funding is channeled into the SPV, which 
enters into a contract with the commissioner. The SPV then acts 
as the delivery body for the intervention and SIB through an 
appointed director” (Cabinet Office UK, 2013) 
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Derbyshire and Leicestershire (AEM, 2015). Given 
their greater resources and past experience 
operating similar pay-by-results contracts, P3 led 
the consortium’s strategic planning. Their tasks 
involved the recruitment of all key staff members, 
including the Project Delivery Manager, and an 
agreement with the local authorities on the referral 
of service users (P3, 2015). Referrals are directed 
to one of the three organizations primarily based on 
geography, but the consortium utilizes their specific 
skillsets to provide the most appropriate service for 
a particular individual – for example, the Y and 
YMCA have a larger stock of short-term 
accommodation to deal with emergency 
presentations, but P3 has more access to the 
private, long-term accommodations market and 
greater experience in providing services to those 
with acute mental health or substance issues (Big 
Issue Invest, 2015). Each client is referred to a link 
worker, who will supervise them over the course 
of the program and help them develop the skills, 
knowledge, responsibility and confidence 
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necessary for independent living. 
The Unit Cost Database determined the expected 
outcomes and the price for this service. According 
to this database, the local authorities have an 
annual expenditure of £8.605 per homeless person 
and £4,257 for a person between the age of 18-24 
with no employment, training or education (New 
Economy, 2015). Based on these calculations and 
a detailed needs-assessment across the region, 
AEM determined the probability of a service user to 
achieve the desired project outcomes. Table 1 
shows the expected performance of the AEM 
project (based on a percentage of the anticipated 
340 person cohort to achieve outcomes across the 
duration of the project) and the agreed costs for the 
commissioner, which is significantly lower in 
comparison to the cost of negative outcomes for the 
government. 
The AEM SIB attracted the investment from both 
socially and financially motivated investors such as 
Big Issue Invest, KeyFund, Delivery Organization 
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Invest and investors under the Social Investment 
Tax Relief regulation. 55% of the investment was 
made by Big Issue Invest (£330,000) and 16% by 
Big Society Capital (£100,000), through SITR. The 
total amount was £600,000. However, the exact 
amount invested by each investor has still not been 
published at the time of this research. In case of 
success, the investors expect an internal rate of 
return (IRR) of up to a 15%. 
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Table 1: Expected outcomes and value per 
outcome AEM SIB 
Outcome 
Final Bid 
Outcome Tariff 
% of Cohort 
Expected to 
Achieve Outcome – 
AEM Average 
Assessments:   
Initial assessment £500 100% 
Second assessment £500 81% 
Third assessment £200 73% 
Accommodation:   
Move into accommodation £425 81% 
Accommodation 
sustained for 3 months 
£1,275 74% 
Accommodation 
sustained for 6 months 
£1,275 71% 
Accommodation sustained 
for 12 months 
£1,275 64% 
Accommodation sustained 
for 18 months 
£1,275 61% 
Education / Training;   
Entry into Education or Training £425 45% 
First Entry Level Qualification £1,275 17% 
First Level 1 Qualification £2,125 29% 
First Level 2 
Qualification  
(or equivalent) 
£2,975 18% 
Employment:   
6 weeks volunteering (6 to 16hrs) £425 41% 
13 weeks volunteering (6 to 16hrs) £425 27% 
20 weeks volunteering (6 to 16hrs) £213 0% 
26 weeks volunteering (6 to 16hrs) £213 0% 
Entry into Employment £425 39% 
13 weeks P/T Employment £2,550 8% 
26 weeks P/T Employment £1,700 6% 
13 weeks F/T Employment £3,825 29% 
26 weeks F/T Employment £2,975 21% 
    (Source: Big Issue Invest, 2015) 
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b. The United States 
The U.S. is characterized by its market-based and 
free enterprise culture. According to Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, the U.S. has a strong anti-
government rhetoric and low public trust, hence, 
both Republicans and Democrats approve of more 
business-like government practices (2011). With 
this rhetoric in mind, the outsourcing of 
governmental responsibilities has been common 
practice; from contracts for general services, e.g. 
prison management, to core governmental and 
statutory functions, e.g. policy-making or education 
(Durant et al., 2009). SIBs - or Pay-For-Success 
(PFS) contracts, as they are commonly referred to 
in the U.S. - fit perfectly into this culture. 
The SIB concept has been rapidly adopted by 
several entities in the US. The Department of 
Justice and the Department of Labor allocated 
funding to develop PFS contracts with the aim to 
reduce crime recidivism. Additionally, the 
Department of the Treasury and the Obama 
administration provided $300m to help state and 
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local governments to implement PFS contracts. The 
initial funding allowed the establishment of the 
Harvard Kennedy School Social Impact Bond 
Technical Assistance Lab (Harvard SIB Lab) in 
2012, which has been a cornerstone of the 
development of the SIB market in the US. By the 
time of this research, two legislations that promote 
PFS schemes are proposed at the federal level, 
“The Social Impact Bond Act (HR 4885)” and the 
“Pay-For-Performance Act (S 2691)” (Social 
Finance, 2015). 
One of the areas identified for pay-for-success 
contracts is high-quality early education for 
disadvantaged children. Income inequality and a 
lack of opportunities for underprivileged kids and 
families has increased in the U.S. (Stiglitz, 2012). 
Studies show that out of 100,000 3- to 4-year-olds 
in Utah, 36% belong to economically 
disadvantaged families and have no access to high 
quality Pre-K education. (United Way of Salt Lake, 
2015). Due to these bad preconditions, these 
children are 25% more likely to become school 
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dropouts, 60% more likely to be arrested and 70% 
more likely to never attend college. In contrast, 
children who receive high-quality early education 
tend to start school on track and stay on track. 
They are also more likely to receive higher 
education and have a higher income than their 
counterparts (ibid). The investment in early 
education can contribute to closing the gap 
between economically advantaged and 
disadvantaged children, increase the quality and 
quantity of human capital available, and also 
reduce the government’s cost for remedial 
interventions, such as special education and 
welfare benefits. 
“Voices for Utah Children” completed a study, in 
which 737 economically disadvantaged children 
from the Granite School District were assessed over 
three years using the Peabody Vocabulary Test10. 
It indicated that, on average, underprivileged 3-
                                                             
10Test to provide a quick estimate of verbal ability and scholastic 
aptitude. 
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year-olds knew 500 words, whereas more privileged 
children of the same age knew up to 1,100 words. 
Based on this result, 238 kids needed support and 
special educational programs. After attending a 
high-quality preschool program, only 11 (5%) of 
them still needed special education programs. 
Furthermore, the gap between the two groups of 
children was closed as the underprivileged 
preschoolers achieved 78% and 76% proficiency in 
language and mathematics, which equals the 
results of the average student in Utah (78% and 
78% respectively) (Voices for Utah Children, 2011). 
Under these premises, the first ever SIB to finance 
early child education was created, the Utah High 
Quality Preschool Program. The impact bond was 
launched by the State of Utah and the Utah Salt 
Lake County. The United Way of Salt Lake served 
as the intermediary. The service delivery started 
on August 1st, 2013. The core idea was to develop 
a tailored high impact curriculum for disadvantaged 
children between 3 and 4 years old, many of 
whom have English as their second language, to 
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increase school readiness and academic 
performance and thereby reduce the need of 
expensive special educational programs. 
To deliver this intervention, the social service 
providers were divided into two sections. On the 
one hand, Voices of Utah Children and the Granite 
School District provided research and analytic 
support, as well as training and professional 
development. On the other hand, the actual 
providers of the intervention were the Granite 
School District itself, Park City School District, 
Guadalupe School, YMCA of Northern Utah, 
Children's Express, and Lit'l Scholars (see figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
 
47 
 
Figure 5: Structure of the Utah High Quality 
Preschool SIB 
 (Source: author) 
Concretely, the J.B. Pritzker Foundation provided 
$2.4m to the intermediary (United Way) as 
subordinate lender. Goldman Sachs Bank USA 
invested $4.6m as senior lender. The initial funding 
was $7m. If the preschool program proves to be 
ineffective, the subordinate lender will only be paid 
after the senior lender receives the principal and 
interest back. Subsequent investments can be 
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made based on the repayments made by the 
public entities. The expected rate of return is 5%. 
However, it is not clear if the rate is annualized or 
not. The implied maximum return of investment is 
approximately $5.5m.  
The following will explain the financial appeal of the 
AEM SIB to the government. The governmental 
expenditure for remedial services and special 
education in public schools (k-12) amounts to 
$2,700 per child per year. The SIB contract 
provides that until the achievement of the initial 
investment ($7m) plus the rate of return of 5%, the 
repayment cost for every successful intervention is 
$2,565 per child per year (corr. 95% of the actual 
cost for remedial services). Afterwards, the 
payment drops down to $1080 per child per year 
(corr. 40% of the cost for remedial services) 
(Learmonth & Sainty, 2015). According to the 
agreement, if 95% of all the program participants 
avoid special education, the program achieves a 
100% rate of success. In this case, the total amount 
of repayment cost is estimated around $27m over 
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twelve years and five cohorts. However, the 
government would still have to cover the cost of 
special education for the remaining 5% of 
participants, which amounts to around $3m in the 
same period. In the best scenario, the total cost for 
the government could be around $30m with the help 
of the SIB; in contrast to around $58m without the 
SIB (only for remedial services and special 
education in public schools). 
c. Germany  
The public services management and political 
context in Germany differs from the U.S. and the 
U.K. Germany belongs to the so called “corporatist” 
group of countries, where intermediary bodies play 
an important role in the management and provision 
of social services (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). So 
far, changes in the German public management 
have emerged from within the public sector and 
were aimed to improve the existing system (Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2011). The reforms targeted 
budgetary controls and public modernization rather 
than marketization or state-reduction (Derlien, 
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1998). According to Salamon et. al, Germany is 
characterized by a significant presence of non-profit 
private organizations concerned with the delivery of 
social services that are mainly financed and 
regulated by public entities (2004). 
Despite the country’s well established welfare 
system, the amount of resources available for 
prevention, innovation, and expansion within the 
social sector is significantly lower in comparison to 
statutory funded areas of the social system 
(National Advisory Board (NAB) Germany, 2014). 
This facilitates the adoption of impact investment 
and SIBs. In Germany, SIBs are regarded as an 
additional source of capital for social programs, 
rather than a competition to the welfare state. 
Statistics presented by the German employment 
agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) show that by 
2014, Germany had around 2.79 million long-time 
unemployed citizens receiving HartzIV11 (Borstel, 
                                                             
11Social welfare benefits accessible to long-time unemployed in 
Germany. Including €391/person/month plus financial assistance in 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
 
51 
 
2015; Schäfer, 2013). Since the establishment of 
the HartzIV scheme in 2005, over one million 
persons have remained in constant welfare 
dependency (Schäfer, 2014). The chances to 
overcome long-time dependency of welfare benefits 
are extremely low, and beneficiaries tend to stay in 
the system for life (Öchsner, 2012). Several barriers 
that impede the integration into the labor market 
have been identified for unemployed people over 25 
years old. The main characteristics include a lack of 
school formation, bad language skills, long-term 
unemployment, immigration, women with young 
children, and people who have a family member 
that requires assistance for more than ten hours 
a week (Klinger & Rothe, 2010; Schäfer, 2013). 
A person receiving HartzIV costs the government 
around €20,00012 per year and can cost up to 
                                                             
housing and health insurance (see: German employment agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit/HartzIV). 
12The direct cost for the government amounts to around 
€1,000/person/month (€12,000/person/year): €391 in cash + 
housing + health insurance. The indirect costs are the social 
contributions (around €5,000/person/year) and taxes (around 
€3,000/person/year) that the beneficiaries would pay if they were 
working for the minimum wage. Altogether, the government pays 
around €20,000/person/year. 
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€1.1m13 in a lifetime. 
In order to develop a tailored preventive program for 
underprivileged and unemployed adolescents that 
are not reached by established governmental 
programs, the Augsburg pilot project was 
configured as the first and only SIB in Germany. It 
was launched in September 2013 by the Bavarian 
State Ministry of Labor, Social and Family Affairs, 
and Integration (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales, Familie und Integration, 
StMAS) and the Juvat Gemeinnützige GmbH, a 
non-profit subsidiary of the Benckiser Foundation 
Future. Juvat is also a contractual partner to 
commissioners, investors and social service 
providers in this intervention (see figure 3). 
The targeted service users are 1,000 unemployed 
adolescents under 25 years old in the Augsburg 
region with no current school attendance and no 
                                                             
13According to the World Bank, the life expectancy in Germany is 80 
years. For a person in the HartzIV system over the age of 25 years, 
this means receiving welfare benefits for 55 years, which corresponds 
to €1.1m (€20,000 * 55 years = €1.1m). 
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completed compulsory education, no ongoing or 
successfully completed apprenticeship, no current 
occupation, no contact to the employment agency, 
and no participation in agency programs over the 
last two years before the intervention (Juvat, 2013). 
The project runs for 27 months, from September 
2013 to December 2015. In a collaborative effort 
between the SIB partners and the governmental 
commissioners, the characteristics of the service 
users, the objective and expected outcomes of the 
intervention, as well as the maximum rates of 
returns, were defined. In order to trigger payments, 
at least 20 service users have to be placed in 
apprenticeships or gainful employment, and remain 
in these positions for more than nine months. 
Furthermore, the jobs must be located either in the 
district of Augsburg or the district of Aichach-
Friedberg and must be subject to social insurance 
and tax contributions.  
 
 
 
DOI 10.13140/RG.2.1.2960.5203 
 
54 
 
Figure 6: Structure of the SIB in Augsburg 
 (Source: author) 
The intervention is delivered by four different social 
service providers: Apeiros e.V., 
Ausbildungsmanagement Augsburg, Kinder, 
Jugend, und Familienhilfe Hochzoll, and Jobline 
gAG München. All of these providers designed 
tailored programs that cover the areas of youth 
welfare, vocational support and career guidance 
services. The service participants receive intensive 
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support and guidance and are provided with a 
safe environment where they learn how to deal 
with possible obstacles in the job market. 
Afterwards, they are placed into an apprenticeship 
program or employment situation with follow-up 
support services (Juvat, 2013). Helping adolescents 
to reintegrate into society, solve their issues, and 
find jobs can drastically reduce the need of 
welfare assistance and other reactive programs in 
the future. 
Four socially motivated investors, BMW Herbert 
Quandt Foundation, BHF-BANK Foundation, 
BonVenture gemeinnützige GmbH, and the 
Eberhard von Kuenheim Foundation of BMW AG, 
provided the up-front capital for the SIB. They also 
assumed the entire default risk. The ex-ante and ex-
post evaluation of the predefined objectives will be 
determined by the Munich-based law firm Dr. 
Mohren & Partner. In addition, the University of 
Hamburg will evaluate the process. In case of 
achieving the expected outcomes, the investors can 
be compensated with a maximum return of 3% for 
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the entire timeline of the project. At the time of this 
research, the exact amount of investments is still 
unknown. 
IV. Discussion 
The multi-stakeholder partnership embodied by 
SIBs introduces complexities that traditional models 
of social service delivery do not entail. This case 
study approach will help us understand how 
different systems deal with the risks and 
opportunities of the SIB model. 
In the U.K., the policies to promote SIBs and the 
social investment market aim to attract both 
socially and financially motivated investors. On the 
one hand, they introduced tax relief schemes for 
social investments, but on the other hand they also 
capped the maximum rates of return which 
reduces the risk of converting SIBs into a mere 
financial instrument. However, the access to new 
sources of capital for the social service sector 
combined with constant cuts in public welfare 
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spending could become a temptation to over-
privatize governmental statutory duties. 
Nevertheless, innovative tools such as the Unit Cost 
Database can incentivize social service providers 
and the government to design successful 
prevention programs based on data. 
Since the adoption of SIBs in the U.S., the 
participation of rather financially motivated 
investors has created a tendency towards non-
capped rates of return, implying higher profits from 
the accomplishment of expected outcomes. This 
could undermine the social motivation of SIBs. In 
this context, the path-dependency of a high 
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of 
welfare services in the U.S. determines the public 
opinion and the socially acceptable levels of return 
for solving social challenges.  
Germany is characterized by its strong government 
and welfare system, which embraces the idea of 
solving social challenges, but limits the public 
approval of high financial returns to private investors 
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for this purpose. In the case of the first and only 
SIB, the German government clearly defined the 
course of action and the financial framework. The 
involvement of only socially motivated investors 
allowed the stakeholders to settle a low rate of 
return. In this sense, the investors may regard an 
SIB as an alternative or better option in comparison 
with a donation and are likely to reinvest the 
financial return of a successful SIB into further 
social projects. 
All three cases focus on preventive data-driven 
interventions, which are analyzed by ex-ante 
feasibility studies during the contract period, and 
then followed-up by ex-post studies to determine if 
the expected outcomes have been achieved. These 
studies provide a clear understanding of the 
intervention model, the capacity of the social service 
providers and the cash flow of the project. A 
bottom-up approach to the development of SIBs 
is crucial to determine the expected outcomes and 
safeguard the intervention against negative 
incentives. Furthermore, it is necessary to have 
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clear lines of authority, good communication among 
the stakeholders and managerial support to develop 
a SIB. 
The targeting of specific outcomes, instead of 
inputs/outputs, gives more flexibility to social 
service providers to deliver real social change and be 
accountable for it. Organizations using a holistic 
approach have the opportunity to learn during the 
implementation process and adapt the intervention 
accordingly. However, it could be difficult and costly 
to develop adequate methods to quantify success 
and determine proper restrictions. Furthermore, as 
McHugh et al. point out, the incentives for social 
service providers to deliver measurable outcomes 
could create a “mission drift”, in which some 
organizations focus their efforts on interventions 
with outcomes that are easier to measure, leaving 
behind underprivileged populations with social 
challenges that are difficult to measure and achieve 
(2013). Nevertheless, the expansion of the social 
investment market has incentivized the 
development of software by companies such as 
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Sinzer, SAM, or the B-lab, which significantly 
reduces the opportunity cost to calculate the price 
per outcome for governments, social service 
providers, and investors. 
Thanks to SIBs, social service providers can expect 
a reliable cash-flow for the entire duration of a 
project which allows them to secure the service 
delivery for the users and focus their energies on 
the project, even if the expected outcomes are not 
achieved. However, there are exceptions. In the 
U.S. and U.K., it is possible to terminate an 
intervention if data suggest that the outcome will 
be delayed or negative in order to give the 
investors and intermediaries the opportunity to 
change the service provider or to completely 
terminate the SIB before losing more money. In this 
case, the social service providers take the 
reputation risk of the intervention. If they fail to 
deliver the expected outcomes, it will be difficult for 
the organization to raise funds in the future. It is 
therefore imperative for providers to carefully 
assess their capabilities and establish achievable 
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outcomes beforehand. 
The initial SIB model contemplated multi-year 
contracts beyond the electoral period. However, in 
the U.K. and Germany the contacts are limited to a 
shorter period. In contrast, the U.S. developed 
regulations to secure governmental appropriation of 
long-term SIBs. If the government is unable to 
repay investors when the agreed-upon outcomes 
have been achieved, its reputation and credit rating 
can be damaged. 
In 2010, JP Morgan estimated that the impact 
investment market has the potential to absorb 
between $400bn and $1tr by 2020 (O’Donohoe et 
al., 2010). The nature of SIBs grants a certain 
degree of independence from economic cycles 
because the underlying driver of financial return is 
based on social, rather than economic outcomes, 
which makes them a suitable portfolio investment. 
Furthermore, SIBs might receive a special tax 
treatment due to their social character, like in the 
U.K. This could transform the resolution of social 
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problems into a profitable business. 
V. Conclusions 
SIBs have been adapted to the different 
governmental systems. On the one hand, the U.K. 
and the U.S. present a more market-oriented 
perspective on impact investing. On the other hand, 
in Germany, the model is seen as a complement 
to the well-established welfare system, where 
only low interest rates for investors are socially 
accepted. Accordingly, the path-dependency of 
governmental institutions determines the degree of 
an SIB’s profit orientation. 
In general terms, SIBs can align government, 
investors and social service providers to create 
positive social impact. They offer the opportunity to 
deliver social services that are tailored to the 
requirements of specific populations and have long-
term effects. They should be promoted as an 
additional source of funding for social programs 
rather than a competition to state welfare 
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programs. Only a healthy interaction between the 
government, the private sector and the social sector 
can really solve social challenges. 
The U.K. is the pioneer in the field. As such, it has 
developed policies to attract capital of both 
financially and socially motivated investors in order 
to establish a social investment market. The Social 
Investment Tax Relief (SITR) regulation and the 
Unit Cost Database are steps in the right direction, 
which help the government and social service 
providers to obtain funding and to understand the 
cost of reactive versus preventative programs. 
Other governments around the world should 
develop similar approaches to complement their 
own social service provisions. 
Governments should calculate the cost per 
outcome (negative and positive) of the different 
social services they provide. Their policies should 
incentivize the development of programs, which 
deliver preventative interventions with better 
outcomes in terms of expenses and social impact. 
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Furthermore, the repayment should be capped to a 
lower cost than the currently implemented reactive 
programs. Moreover, journalists and researchers 
should be granted access to the data of SIBs in 
order to increase their legitimacy. 
The real innovation driven by SIBs is the use of 
data in the creation of public policies. The 
government has the opportunity to realize a one-
time-investment in order to teach commissioners to 
understand and calculate outcomes. Furthermore, 
the opportunity cost to calculate the social return 
of investments and the impact of specific 
interventions has declined with the emergence of 
specialized software. Eventually, commissioners 
could apply their knowledge to other policy areas 
beyond SIBs, creating a spillover-effect for data-
driven policymaking. 
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A Proposed Framework to 
Analyze the Impact Investing 
Ecosystem in a Cross-
Country Perspective1  
Juan David Rivera Acevedo2, Min-ni Wu3 
Abstract: 
This study developed an impact investing ecosystem 
framework to present a comprehensive overview of 
the impact investing sector, identifying key 
challenges and possibilities. Two Asian countries, 
Japan and Singapore, were used as case studies. 
The proposed framework reveals that the market 
scales in Japan and Singapore are small and each 
country faces unique challenges for developing 
impact investing. For Japan, the low level of 
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philanthropic activities and the small social sector are 
the key challenges to overcome for impact investing 
growth. For Singapore, the government’s low social 
expending strategy may limit the development. 
However, both countries have supportive 
environments for impact investing due to high-quality 
human resources, well-developed financial markets 
and political interest. In particular, the high total 
wealth of high network individuals (HNWI) in Japan 
and large donations to charities in Singapore (% 
GDP) offer rich potential. 
Key words: Entrepreneurial Ecosystem, Impact 
Investing, Public Policy, Social Impact Investment 
Framework, Social Impact Bonds. 
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I. Introduction 
New approaches to address increasing social 
challenges are necessary, especially as national 
economies develop and additional strain is placed on 
social and environmental demands. Pollution, natural 
resource exhaustion, income inequality, and 
increasing healthcare costs are new problems 
requiring attention across the globe. While the 
challenges are growing, the traditional solutions from 
the public sector that have been relied upon are 
insufficient — many governments are debt-ridden, 
and charities and non-profit organizations (NPOs) 
continue to struggle to raise funds. In this context, 
impact investing has emerged as an innovative 
cross-sector arrangement to support the work of the 
social sector while still generating financial revenue. 
In this process, impact investors provide capital to 
organizations with social purposes (SPOs), aiming at 
creating both financial and social returns (Bugg-
Levine & Emerson, 2011; Nicholls, 2010).  
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During the past decade, efforts have been made to 
build a formal impact investing industry at a global 
level. Market infrastructures, networks, platforms, 
and methods to measure social impacts have been 
established (Jackson, 2013). In addition, academic 
research has provided empirical evidence that 
impact investing has been successfully implemented 
in a wide range of forms (Ormiston et al., 2015). 
Governmental institutions, such as the European 
Commission and G8 countries (now G7) led by the 
United Kingdom, have shown their support 
(European Commission, 2011; SIITF, 2014). The 
emergence of impact bonds has also actively 
included public capital in the practice of impact 
investing. Across the globe, there are currently 89 
impact bonds being implemented and capital 
amounting to USD 322 million has been raised for the 
projects (Social Finance UK, 2017). 
Despite the attention and support, more commitment 
is needed to stimulate the development of impact 
investing globally. Geographically, the major actors 
in the impact investing market are based in Europe 
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and North America (Jackson, 2013). In Asia, where 
impact investing is a relatively new concept, only a 
few players are involved (Asian Development Bank, 
2011). There is very limited academic literature 
focusing on this topic. As the structure and function 
of the social sector varies across different countries, 
further contextual examination is necessary, 
particularly with regard to Asia. Therefore, the 
primary attempt of this research is to propose a 
framework to assess and compare the impact 
investing ecosystems in a cross-country perspective, 
taking into account the role of public policy in the 
development of the market, and then offering policy 
recommendations. For this purpose, this research 
applies an entrepreneurial ecosystem approach 
(based on the Babson Entrepreneurship Ecosystem 
Project (BEEP)) and adapts it to the context of impact 
investing based on the Social Impact Investment 
Framework from the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). With this 
approach, a comprehensive overview of the 
development is presented, possibilities and 
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challenges for impact investing are identified, and the 
key determinants are evaluated. Japan and 
Singapore are used as case studies, and the highly 
developed UK impact investing market is used as a 
benchmark for policies and strategies concerning 
market development. 
This paper is organized into four sections: the first 
section explains the concept of impact investing and 
provides the theoretical framework for the proposed 
social impact investing framework. The second 
section presents the six domains of the framework, 
and the methodology used to select the indicators for 
evaluating the ecosystem in the selected countries. 
The third section analyzes and interprets the relevant 
findings to answer the research questions: What are 
the current developments of impact investing in 
Asia? Who are the main actors in the market? What 
are the possibilities and challenges? How can public 
policy enable the development of impact investing? 
The fourth section presents the conclusions and 
policy recommendations for each country 
individually. 
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II. Theoretical Framework 
A. Impact Investing 
The term “impact investing” was coined in 2007 by 
the Rockefeller Foundation (Harji & Jackson, 2012). 
It presents a new investment logic that has gained 
growing attention over the past decade — the impact 
investors provide capital to social entrepreneurs, 
actively aiming at creating measurable social 
changes with the goal of obtaining financial returns 
as well (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; Jackson, 
2013; Nicholls, 2010). Following this model, various 
investment activities have emerged across the globe. 
Impact investing is a new political-economic 
arrangement between the government, business, 
and social sectors. More concretely, it emerged 
alongside three major trends. Firstly, it is related to 
an attitude change toward new capitalism (Dacin et 
al., 2011; Clark et al., 2014). Society now requires a 
more sustainable and ethical way to develop the 
economy. For example, consumers in the newer 
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generations demand “good” products that are 
environmentally and socially ethical (Herman, 2010; 
Nicholls & Opal, 2005). This change of attitude has 
stimulated the practice of impact investing, giving 
financial incentives for investors to create social 
values. Secondly, impact investing is seen as the 
evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
and Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) 
movements (Ormiston et al., 2015). The third trend 
that contributes to impact investing is the change of 
the social sector. During the past decades, the social 
sector has begun to adopt and adapt business 
techniques in order to address social problems, 
generating revenue to be more self-sustaining; 
accordingly, social enterprises have emerged 
(Borzaga & Defourny, 2001, 2004; Seelos & Mair, 
2005; Volkmann et al., 2012). These developments 
shaped the modern social sector in a way that 
resembles market economies and created investing 
opportunities for impact investors. 
These trends show that impact investing serves as a 
cross-sector collaborative approach that can create 
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joint benefits for all three participating parties. For 
governments, it helps them solve social problems; for 
private investors, it responds to the demands of 
consumers and creates financial benefits; and for the 
social sector, it provides needed resources and 
improves their effectiveness.  
The impact investing sector is still young and faces 
several challenges, including a lack of sufficient 
capital and high-quality investment opportunities 
(Wilson et al., 2015; Achleitner et al., 2011), and the 
need of more enabling environments, effective 
intermediaries, and proper legal frameworks for 
further growth (Bugg-Levine & Goldstein, 2009; 
Mendell & Barbosa, 2013; Wilson et al., 2015). To 
overcome these challenges, more governmental 
involvement is recommended to shape and boost the 
market (Mendell & Barbosa, 2013; Moore et al., 
2012b; Sunley & Pinch, 2012; Wood et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, a more tailored academic engagement 
is needed to support the design of effective 
interventions. Research has yet to theorize on the 
investment structure and clearly define the 
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epistemological boundaries (Moore et al., 2012a). 
Despite Nicholls’ (2010) significant contribution to 
conceptualize impact investments and examine the 
investment logic and rationality, impact investing 
requires further conceptual clarification. At this early 
stage of development, researchers have diverse 
understandings of the notion and difficulty providing 
a precise definition (Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015; 
Moore et al 2012a; Wilson et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
there is a wide range of related terms to describe 
impact investing that are utilized interchangeably or 
with overlapping concepts (Louche et al., 2012; 
Wilson et al., 2015; Wood & Hagerman, 2010). The 
most common ones are social investing and socially 
responsible investing (SRI) (Höchstädter & Scheck, 
2015). Despite the use of different terms, the 
concepts do not differ from impact investing 
fundamentally (Louche et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 
2015; Wood & Hagerman, 2010). The term “social 
investing” emerged earlier in 2000 and is commonly 
used in Europe in line with impact investing. It usually 
covers a broader meaning and includes all investing 
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actions with a social or environmental purpose 
(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015; Wilson et al., 2015). 
The term “SRI” is used to describe a more traditional 
view of ethical or sustainable investing (Höchstädter 
& Scheck, 2015). For our research purposes, the two 
terms are included in the discussion of impact 
investing, in an attempt to cover the full potential of 
its development. 
According to the literature review, the general 
definition of impact investing centers on three core 
elements: the creation of both social and financial 
returns, the intention, and measurable impacts. 
Namely, investors intentionally provide capital to 
organizations to generate a “blended value” of both 
social impacts and financial profits (Höchstädter & 
Scheck, 2015; Nicholls, 2010). The idea of blended 
value creation attempts to focus on both of these 
outcomes without trade-offs (Emerson, 2003), and 
this idea represents what impact investing aims to 
achieve (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011). While 
discussions of impact investing highlight the intention 
and measurement of social impacts, the level of 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n4p87 
84 
 
financial return rates is usually not limited and the 
investors can adopt different investment strategies 
(Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015; Nicholls, 2010). This 
research is based on this general understanding of 
impact investing. In this context, impact investing can 
be practiced in a wide range of forms to address 
social or environmental issues wherever needed. 
Firstly, impact investing can appear in the form of 
debt, equity, loans, microfinance funds, venture 
philanthropy, or hybrid capital (Achleitner et al., 2011; 
Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; Ormiston et al., 
2015). In other words, impact investors can choose 
from a broad spectrum of investing strategies for any 
combination of social and financial risks and returns, 
according to their investing interest and rationality 
(Nicholls, 2010; Rangan et al., 2011; SIITF, 2014). 
As a consequence, the flexibility and diversity of 
strategy options in the impact investing market 
attracts various types of investors seeking social 
and/or environmental impact plus profit. 
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B. The OECD Social Impact Investment 
Framework 
To explore the landscape of impact investing and the 
role public policy can play in catalyzing its 
development, a comprehensive understanding of the 
actors and influencing factors in the impact investing 
industry is necessary. Because the impact investing 
market is nascent, the focus of the academic field is 
usually on measuring the impact of value creation 
rather than evaluating the entire impact investing 
market (Jackson, 2013). Hence, there are limited 
approaches available for the analysis of current 
developments. The most systemic approach is 
provided by the OECD. 
As shown in Figure 1, the Social Impact Investment 
Framework by the OECD presents the elements that 
make up the social impact investment market (Wilson 
et al., 2015). It provides a clear overview of the 
impact investing industry as an “ecosystem”, 
identifying the relevant actors, investing channels 
and influencing factors in the market. This concept 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n4p87 
86 
 
closely corresponds to this study’s goal to explore the 
scale and size of the impact investing market in a 
cross-country perspective. Nevertheless, the 
framework combines different types of key factors 
under the same category “enabling environment”. 
Given that this research attempts to explore the 
impact investing industry for policy-makers, it is 
essential to examine these core enabling 
environment conditions in a more organized way, 
avoiding omissions and without too much focus on 
the investors, investees, and intermediaries. 
Therefore, this research reorganized the elements of 
this framework based on an associated 
entrepreneurial ecosystem approach. 
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Figure 1. OECD’s Social Impact Investment 
Framework 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from Wilson et al., 2015. 
C. The Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Approach 
Since the OECD framework to examine the impact 
investing industry is limited, this research paper 
explores the ecosystem approach utilized in the field 
of entrepreneurship creation. The entrepreneurial 
ecosystem approach provides a comprehensive 
method to examine, support, or stimulate 
entrepreneurship. It studies the creation of new 
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businesses in a region as the outcome of a self-
sustaining entrepreneurial ecosystem with a unique 
environment, consisting of various interacting 
components (Isenberg & Onyemah, 2016; Neck et 
al., 2004; Stam, 2015). A healthy entrepreneurial 
ecosystem is believed to lead to job creation and 
economic growth (ibid). For public policy, this 
approach presents a holistic and systemic view, 
focusing on enabling a self-sustaining ecosystem 
that leads to entrepreneurship growth instead of 
intervening in the business of particular 
entrepreneurs (Ács et al., 2014; Autio et al., 2014; 
Mason & Brown, 2014; Stam, 2015). Measuring the 
existing ecosystem could provide a comprehensive 
overview of the enabling actors, the possible 
challenges, and opportunities. Hence, mapping the 
ecosystem could be the first step towards 
encouraging entrepreneurial actions. 
This approach was chosen for the following reasons. 
First, the impact investing sector resembles 
traditional entrepreneurship activities as it involves 
the creation of both social and financial values. By 
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considering impact investing an emerging new sector 
of entrepreneurship, this approach is suitable to help 
understand current developments, identify the 
actors, potential and challenges in the market, and 
consequently provide the information required to 
design suitable policies. In addition, the concept of 
examining entrepreneurship like an ecosystem has 
similarities to the Social Impact Investing Framework 
developed by the OECD. Lastly, previous research 
has also applied a broader ecosystem approach in 
the field of modern economics for various sectors 
with different scopes and objectives (Adner, 2017; 
Cohen, 2006; Ferdinand & Meyer, 2017; Fraiberg, 
2017; Park & Choi, 2014). 
This study utilizes the entrepreneurial ecosystem 
framework from the Babson Entrepreneurship 
Ecosystem Project (BEEP). As presented in Figure 
2, the BEEP identifies the key components of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem by categorizing them into 
six domains: policy, markets, human capital, culture, 
supports, and finance (Isenberg & Onyemah, 2016). 
These elements form an interactive and self-
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sustaining environment that leads to 
entrepreneurship growth (ibid). The BEEP 
framework was chosen because it focuses more on 
the interacting actors and factors instead of 
measuring their performances and impacts, which is 
more suitable for an industry in an early stage of 
development. Moreover, it is more general and 
conceptual, as it does not utilize a defined set of 
indicators. This allows for more flexibility in the 
selection of proper indicators, which is necessary 
given the nature of the impact investing industry.  
Isenberg (2016), the head of the BEEP project, 
argues that the entrepreneurship ecosystem should 
be observed in small geographic units4 because 
some components of the framework are linked to 
culture (e.g. risk aversion, ambition, creativity, etc.), 
which differs across regions. However, studies 
focusing on national systems of entrepreneurship 
exist as well (see Ács et al., 2014). For this study, the 
                                                             
4For example, cities with a population of less than 2 million (see 
Isenberg & Onyemah, 2016 for cases). 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n4p87 
91 
 
BEEP framework will be adapted to assess the 
impact investing sector within the selected cases on 
a national level. Nevertheless, to further understand 
the environment and design policies for impact 
investment, examination at sub-national levels is 
recommended. 
 
Figure 2. BEEP: Components of the Ecosystem 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from Isenberg & Onyemah, 2016. 
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D. The Impact Investing Ecosystem Framework 
Considering that the impact investing sector is 
different from traditional entrepreneurship, this 
research combined and adapted the two above 
mentioned frameworks. Thus, a new framework was 
established – the Impact Investment Ecosystem 
Framework, as shown in Figure 3. It is based on the 
six domains categorized by the BEEP ecosystem 
framework: policy, markets, human capital, culture, 
supports, and finance (Isenberg & Onyemah, 2016). 
The determinants of the OECD’s Social Impact 
Investment Framework have been reorganized into 
these six domains. Some of the aspects considered 
in BEEP, but not in the OECD’s Social Impact 
Investment Framework, have been added to 
complement the domains of this new framework. The 
environment variable in the market domain, has been 
added by the authors to acknowledge the fact that 
impact investment can create environmental value as 
well. The aspect of networks has been allocated to 
the supports domain rather than the market domain 
considering their essential role in supporting the 
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industry and building capacity.  
Figure 3: Impact Investing Ecosystem Framework 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from Wilson et al., 2015 and 
Isenberg & Onyemah, 2016 
III. Methodology 
The proposed impact investing ecosystem 
framework was applied in a case study approach to 
obtain empirical insight into the development of 
impact investing in Asia. Japan and Singapore were 
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selected as cases. While impact investing is still 
nascent in Asia, the two chosen countries have 
relatively active impact investing markets compared 
to other Asian countries. Japan is a member of the 
G8 (now G7) Social Impact Investment Taskforce to 
catalyze the development of impact investing across 
the globe (SIITF, 2017), while Singapore is the home 
of important impact investing networks in Asia, such 
as the Asian Venture Philanthropy Network (AVPN) 
and Impact Investment Exchange Asia (IIX). 
The benchmark for this research is the highly 
developed impact investing market in the UK, which 
is currently the largest across the globe. 
Furthermore, with the British government’s support, 
various research studies and practices were 
conducted over the years. Consequently, the UK 
provides the most data on the development of impact 
investing (Wilson et al., 2015) and serves as a 
suitable reference point to make cross-country 
comparisons. 
To assess the six domains of the proposed impact 
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investing ecosystem framework, a set of indicators 
was selected. This research used secondary data 
from well-established cross-country development 
indicators and official governmental information to 
assure data credibility. Additional information from 
key impact investing networks in Asia, such as the 
AVPN, were utilized as a proxy to estimate the 
market size and identify key players. 
The policy domain of the framework examines the 
political context influencing the impact investing 
ecosystem in two aspects: leadership and 
government. The leadership determinant concerns 
the general political context that enables impact 
investing. It is assessed through the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank 
(2016), such as political stability, government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. The 
government determinant refers to legislation and 
governmental interventions. It is evaluated through 
the existence or absence of an appropriate legal 
framework (legal forms for social enterprises in 
particular), the key initiatives, laws, and policies that 
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the government has developed in relation to impact 
investing. This data was collected through 
governmental publications and the reports published 
under the Social Impact Investment Taskforce. 
The determinants assessed in the markets domain 
are demand (social needs), market demand-side 
actors, and supply-side actors. A set of indicators 
was selected to measure social needs, including the 
Social Progress Index (the variables of which are 
health and wellness, personal safety, shelter, water 
and sanitation, environmental quality, and maternal 
and child mortality rates) (Social Progress 
Imperative, 2017), the World Bank indicators 
(population ages 65 and above, unemployment rate) 
(2017a; 2017b), OECD’s (2017b) GINI Coefficient for 
income inequality, and the UNDP’s (2016) Human 
Development Index (Gender Inequality Index). The 
demand-side actors of the market were measured 
through the number and size of the actors, according 
to the country-specific forms of related organizations 
and governmental data. The supply-side actors of the 
market were assessed through the amount of 
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investments made by these actors to address social 
needs. The indicators include the government’s 
social expenditure (OECD, 2017a; Singapore 
Government, 2017), the budget of charities and 
NPOs (Cabinet Office, Japan 2016; COC, Singapore 
Government, 2015; Government of UK, 2017a), total 
donations to charities (JFRA, 2015; COC, Singapore 
Government, 2015; NCVO, 2017), total sustainable 
investment assets (Eurosif, 2016; GSIA, 2016), the 
size of the impact investment market (Big Society 
Capital, 2015; Japan NAB, 2016) and the total wealth 
of high network individuals (HNWIs) (Capgemini, 
2016). Additionally, examples of impact investors 
were collected. 
The human capital domain, particularly education 
and training, were assessed through the education 
index shown in the human development index (HDI) 
by the UNDP (2016), the years of tertiary schooling 
according to the Social Progress Index (Social 
Progress Imperative, 2017) and the Program for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) by the 
OECD (2015). Furthermore, several research 
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institutions with a focus on impact investing were 
examined based on desk research, utilizing 
information collected by the AVPN (Mohan et al., 
2017) and the institutions’ official websites. 
Nevertheless, it was difficult to ascertain whether an 
institution does research on impact investing. 
The culture domain analyzes political economy 
considerations, including cultural perspectives and 
the social system. The cultural perspectives on 
impact investing were assessed using the World 
Giving Index (CAF, 2016) as a proxy for citizen 
attitudes and willingness to engage in solving social 
problems. The social systems, in this research 
defined as the political and economic structure of the 
society, were examined based on Acemoglu and 
Robinson’s (2013) research on the influences of 
“inclusive” or “extractive” political economic 
structures. 
The supports domain uses a set of relevant 
organizations to analyze the intermediaries, 
networks and platforms of impact investing in each 
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country and provides a list of examples. 
The finance domain examines the general financial 
development. The development was assessed 
through the World Bank Development Indicators 
(central government finance: debts) (2017c), the 
World Economic Forum’s Inclusive Development 
Index (financial intermediation of real economy 
investment) (2017), and the World Competitiveness 
Index (macroeconomic environment, financial 
market development, and market size) (2016). All 
indicators are listed in the table annexed to this 
paper. 
The limitation of this methodology is related to the 
difficult access to measurable and comparable data 
for Japan, Singapore and the UK. Since the impact 
investing industry is at an early stage of development 
in Asia, there is often insufficient information 
available. 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
A. The Policy Domain 
Leadership: General political context. Understanding 
the governments’ role in the impact investing 
ecosystem is essential for creating a positive 
environment. Generally speaking, the political 
environments for impact investing in Japan, 
Singapore, and the UK are enabling. All countries 
gain positive governance scores in all six WGI 
indicators by the World Bank (2016), except for 
Singapore. But although Singapore has a -0.1 score 
(-2.5 to +2.5) in voice and accountability, it has nearly 
perfect scores in the other five indicators, which still 
implies an enabling political environment for 
governance and implementing interventions (ibid). 
As for Japan, its regulatory quality (+1.2) and rule of 
law (+1.5) are slightly lower than those of Singapore 
(+2.3 and +1.9) and the UK (+1.9 and +1.8) (ibid). 
Therefore, it might face more regulatory barriers 
when developing impact investing. For the UK, the 
score in political stability and absence of violence is 
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significantly lower (+0.6) than the scores for Japan 
(+1.0) and Singapore (+1.2) (ibid); this could 
increase uncertainty in the development of impact 
investing if the political interest changes. 
Government: Regulatory frameworks for social 
enterprises. The existence of enabling regulatory 
frameworks for social enterprises can directly 
increase investment opportunities for impact 
investors. Currently, the legal status of social 
enterprises is still complex and without a precise 
definition in the three countries. There has been 
more progress in the UK. While social enterprises 
can appear in many forms, a specific form, the 
community interest company (CIC), was established 
in 2004 for businesses that benefit the community 
(Government of UK, 2017b; UK NAB, 2014). In 
Singapore, social enterprises come in various 
entities including for-profit and non-profit (The Law 
Society of Singapore, 2016). However, the 
government-funded Singapore Centre for Social 
Enterprise (raiSE) has provided a status for social 
enterprises with memberships (raiSE, 2017). For 
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Japan, there is no specific legal entity for social 
enterprises either (Japan NAB, 2014). The closest 
effort is the report conducted by the cabinet office to 
define social enterprises and estimate the market 
scale (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2015). 
To help create more impact investments, the three 
countries, especially Japan, should further consider 
a specific legal framework for social enterprises. 
Government: Interventions and incentives for impact 
investing. The policy interest in impact investing is 
evident for all three countries. The UK government is 
the most active, with a wide range of initiatives, 
regulations, and policies to support the development 
of impact investing, including encouraging investors, 
improving financial environments for social 
organizations, engaging public actors, building 
market capacity and infrastructure and creating 
social impact bonds (see annex). In Japan, two key 
policies were developed under the initiative of the 
Social Impact Investment Taskforce, based on the 
experiences in the UK. Firstly, the government 
passed a law to enable the use of capital from 
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dormant bank accounts for impact investing 
purposes. The implementation of this policy is 
expected by 2019 and is applicable to dormant 
capital since the end of 2016. The approach is similar 
to the UK’s Big Society Capital (The Japan Times, 
2016). Secondly, three pilot projects of social impact 
bonds were launched in 2015, focusing on family 
care, aging support, and youth employment (Japan 
NAB, 2016; The Nippon Foundation, 2015). These 
developments in Japan are considered an 
encouraging progress for impact investing. In 
Singapore, there are policies which imply an indirect, 
not yet specific political interest in the impact 
investing market, such as providing attractive tax 
incentives for donations, supporting social 
enterprises and the social sector (see annex).  
In summary, for further development of the impact 
investing market, the two Asian countries should 
pursue a comprehensive plan with various types of 
policies like in the UK. 
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B. The Markets Domain 
Demand: Social needs. If social problems are 
present, there is the opportunity for impact investing 
to develop a new approach to solve them. Compared 
with Japan and Singapore, the UK seems to have a 
greater need to handle social problems in most of the 
selected areas of this research. However, there is a 
demand for impact investing in all three countries, 
although with different focuses and levels of priority.  
Regarding the aging of the population, there is a high 
demand for social projects in all three countries. The 
Japanese society faces the most serious problem of 
aging: 26% of the population in Japan were above 65 
years old in 2015 (World Bank, 2017a). While this 
figure is lower for the UK and Singapore (18% and 
12% respectively), it is still higher than the world 
average (8.3%) and therefore raises concerns (ibid). 
For disability and health issues, assessed through 
the Social Progress Index’s Health and Wellness 
indicators, the three countries gain similar scores, 
although Japan presents the lowest (79.89 out of 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n4p87 
105 
 
100). The performance of the three countries is 
acceptable, but there is still a demand for healthcare 
programs (Social Progress Imperative, 2017).  
There is a greater demand to improve the welfare for 
children and families in Singapore and the UK. 
Singapore presents a higher maternal mortality rate 
(9.98 deaths per 100,000 live births), while the 
figures for the UK (9.11) and Japan (5.43) are 
considerably lower (Social Progress Imperative, 
2017). For child mortality, the UK has a higher rate 
(4.2), while Japan and Singapore have the same rate 
(2.7 deaths per 1,000 live births) (ibid). In addition, all 
three countries face the problem of income inequality 
as they all present figures higher than the OECD 
average (OECD, 2017a; OECD, 2017b; Department 
of Statistics Singapore, 2016). Regarding gender, 
Singapore has a remarkably low gender inequality5 
(0.068), but the figures for Japan and the UK are also 
low (0.116 and 0.131 respectively), showing few 
                                                             
5The scores of the index: 0 equals to complete equality and 1 equals 
to complete inequality. 
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differences between men and women (UNDP, 2016). 
For public order and safety, all three countries 
earned high scores in the Social Progress Index: 
Singapore scored 93.90 out of 100, the score for 
Japan is 91.66, and that for the UK is 85.45 (Social 
Progress Imperative, 2017). However, there is still 
room for improvement, especially in the UK. For 
house ownership, Japan and Singapore obtained the 
similar good scores in the indicator of shelter in the 
Social Progress Index, at 93.25 and 94.28 out of 100, 
respectively (Social Progress Imperative, 2017). The 
UK has a lower score of 87.53, due to a much more 
serious problem of affordable housing compared with 
Japan and Singapore (ibid). Concerning the job 
market, the three countries have lower 
unemployment rates than the world average. The UK 
has the highest unemployment rate among the three 
at 4.8% of the total labor force; for Japan it is 3.1%, 
and for Singapore it is only 1.8% (World Bank, 
2017b). 
For the environment aspect, the set of indicators for 
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environmental quality according to the Social 
Progress Index was examined. Japan has the lowest 
total score at 83.82 and the highest greenhouse gas 
emissions (Social Progress Imperative, 2017). In 
contrast, outdoor air pollution-attributable deaths are 
significantly higher in Singapore than in the UK and 
Japan (ibid). Furthermore, Singapore’s biodiversity 
and habitat protection is weaker. While the UK shows 
positive results for most of the indicators of 
environmental quality, the greenhouse gas 
emissions are much higher than in Singapore. The 
environment conditions in the three countries are 
generally acceptable. Yet, there is the demand to 
improve different aspects. 
 
Demand-side actors. The set of country-specific 
relevant demand-side actors for the three countries 
is annexed. The presence of these organizations 
implies the potential demand for impact investments. 
As the types of actors are different in the three 
countries, this research only compares the numbers 
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for three similar forms — NPOs/charities, social 
enterprises, and cooperatives/cooperative societies 
— by adjusting the numbers according to population. 
Compared with Japan and Singapore (both with 
around 4 per 10,000 inhabitants), the UK has 
extremely large numbers of NPOs/charities (25 per 
10,000 inhabitants). The UK also has the most social 
enterprises (114 per 10,000 inhabitants). The results 
show that the UK has a much more active social 
sector, which provides higher supply and potential for 
impact investing. A weaker social sector can be more 
challenging for impact investing growth, as the 
society is more likely to rely on a traditional approach 
(the government) to address social issues, which is 
especially the case for Japan. However, the 
Japanese and Singaporean government can still 
apply impact investing, especially with social impact 
bonds, where the government is actively involved 
while reducing governmental burdens.  
Supply-side actors. The amount of social spending 
can indicate the government’s willingness to address 
social issues and their potential source of supply. In 
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addition, it can indirectly justify the need for a cross-
sector collaboration to optimize the use of these 
resources. Except for Singapore, the levels of 
governmental social expenditure are high. The 
governments of Japan and the UK spend over 20% 
of their GDP on social issues (OECD, 2017a). 
Singapore, on the other hand, spends only 8.2% of 
its GDP on social development (Singapore 
Government, 2017). This indicates that the potential 
supply for impact investment from the government is 
more than twice as high in the UK and Japan as in 
Singapore. 
The supply for impact investing can also be 
estimated through the budget of charities and total 
donations to charities. The charities in Singapore 
have the highest average budget at USD 4.7 million 
per year (COC, Singapore Government, 2015), while 
for the UK it is USD 0.56 million per year 
(Government of UK, 2017a) and for Japan it is USD 
0.43 million per year (Cabinet Office, Government of 
Japan, 2016). In terms of percent of the national 
GDP, charities in Singapore receive higher donations 
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than in the UK and Japan (COC, Singapore 
Government, 2015; JFRA, 2015; NCVO, 2017). This 
implies that the potential supply for impact investing 
is higher for Singapore or the UK. Another finding 
regards the source of donations, namely from 
individuals or the corporate/private sector. In Japan6, 
corporate donations are about the same amount as 
individual donations, while in the UK, corporate 
donations represent only a small part of the total 
donations (JFRA, 2015; NCVO, 2017). This 
additional information is important for developing 
impact investing because it indicates cultural 
differences. 
As another potential supply for impact investing, 
Japan holds the most HNWI wealth among the three 
countries at USD 6.57 trillion, while the figures for the 
UK and Singapore are lower at USD 2.02 trillion and 
USD 527.1 billion respectively, according to 
                                                             
6For Singapore, there is no comparable data on the sources of 
donations. However, there are available data for individual donations 
(NVPC, 2016) and sources of donations of above one million dollars 
(Coutts, 2015). 
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Capgemini’s Global Wealth Report (2016). 
Regarding the amount of actual impact investments, 
the UK has the largest supply. The Global 
Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) reflects that 
the UK currently holds the most sustainable 
investment assets (7.61% of global assets), whereas 
Japan has 2.07% and Singapore only 0.02% (GSIA, 
2016; Eurosif, 2016). While this calculation has 
adopted a broader definition for sustainable 
investment (GISA, 2016), additional information 
about the market size with a narrower definition of 
impact investing is available for Japan and the UK. 
The UK’s impact investment value was worth USD 
1.92 billion in 2015 (Big Society Capital, 2016), and 
Japan presented a much smaller market share of 
USD 0.30 billion (Japan NAB, 2016). These two 
indicators show that the current impact investing 
industry in the UK is much more developed 
compared with Japan and Singapore. However, 
there are opportunities for the markets in Japan and 
Singapore to grow, especially when considering the 
high HNWI wealth in Japan and the larger amount of 
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donations (% GDP) to charities in Singapore. 
A list of selected impact investors in Japan, 
Singapore and the UK is annexed. The governments 
of all three countries have started to participate in the 
impact investing market, such as the Japan Finance 
Corporation (JFC) in Japan, raiSE in Singapore, and 
Big Society Capital in the UK. Compared with Japan, 
Singapore has more international impact investors, 
such as the LGT Impact Ventures (IV), LeapFrog 
Investments, and Bamboo Finance. 
C. The Human Capital Domain 
General education attainment. The development of 
impact investing as an innovative approach to 
address social needs will benefit from better 
education and human resources, as these factors 
facilitate innovation (Mariz-Pérez et al., 2012). The 
Education Index from UNDP’s Human Development 
Index measures the average length of education in a 
country (UNDP, 2016). The three countries all have 
high scores. The figure for Japan is 0.842 (on a scale 
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between 0 and 1; 1 being the highest), for Singapore 
it is 0.814 and for the UK it is 0.896 (ibid). While the 
figure for Singapore is slightly lower, the country 
instead presents the highest result concerning 
tertiary education. According to the Social Progress 
Index, the duration of tertiary schooling is 1.73 years 
in Singapore, 1.37 years in Japan and only 0.96 
years in the UK (Social Progress Imperative, 2017). 
To evaluate the quality of education, this study used 
the OECD’s (2015) PISA assessment which targets 
15-year-old students in different countries and 
measures their performance in science, 
mathematics, and reading. Students in Singapore 
and Japan presented significantly high achievements 
in all three subjects, while the performance of UK 
students was about average for an OECD country 
(ibid). In addition, only 4.8% of students in Singapore 
had low performances in all three subjects compared 
with 5.6% in Japan (ibid). In the UK, 10.1% were low 
performers in all subjects; this is not much better than 
other OECD countries (13.0%) (ibid).  
Singapore and Japan present considerably better 
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results in the above indicators, while all three 
countries have well-developed human capital to a 
certain extent. The quality and quantity of human 
resources in Singapore and Japan are highly 
advanced, compared with the UK and other 
countries. This provides a positive environment for 
impact investing. The valuable human capital in 
Japan and Singapore enables the creation of social 
innovations. This is especially the case for 
Singapore, where the performances are outstanding. 
Research institutions for impact investing. Whether 
there is research interest in impact investing in a 
country can influence the degree of development, 
since accessible knowledge is essential for 
innovative ideas. This research highlights a few 
examples as a proxy for the environment of impact 
investing research. Impact investing is a new field 
with unclear boundaries, therefore this research 
includes NPOs and philanthropy, social impact, 
social enterprises, social innovation, and social 
finance. The AVPN’s latest report on the landscape 
of impact investing in Asia identified the key relevant 
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research institutions in 16 Asian regions (Mohan et 
al., 2017). Most of the identified research institutions 
in Singapore are universities, while for Japan there 
are more non-profit associations and foundations 
(ibid). In the UK, based on online keyword research, 
several research institutions exist (see annex). A few 
research institutions in these three countries have 
begun to focus on impact investing. It is particularly 
worth mentioning the establishment of the Social 
Investment Research Council (SIRC) which consists 
of five founding members (Big Lottery Fund, Big 
Society Capital, the Cabinet Office, Citi, and the City 
of London) and coordinates impact investing 
research efforts in the interest of key market actors 
(Big Society Capital, 2015). This is a significant 
development for impact investing research. 
However, the field would benefit from further 
academic engagement. The governments of Japan 
and Singapore could follow the example of the SIRC 
initiative in the UK and encourage a research 
collaboration. 
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D. The Culture Domain 
Culture perspectives on impact investing. Cultural 
perspectives examine to what extent civil society is 
willing to engage in addressing social challenges. 
The World Giving Index provides insights into the 
attitudes of citizens with regard to helping a stranger, 
donating money, and volunteering (CAF, 2016). This 
could be a proxy for understanding the cultural 
differences regarding impact investing. Among the 
three countries, the UK obtains the highest rank for 
philanthropic activities, ranking in the top eight in the 
world (ibid). Singapore is ranked 28th; the 
participation in these activities is approximately 10% 
lower (ibid). Clearly behind the UK and Singapore, 
Japan is ranked 114th in the world; only 24% of the 
citizens in the survey participate in philanthropic 
activities and the score is 30% lower than that of the 
UK (ibid). 
These very different figures demonstrate how the 
culture of giving differs in the three societies. The UK 
has a very active social sector that can contribute to 
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solving social problems and further lead to the 
development of social innovations. The culture of 
giving is also promising in Singapore, which 
represents an enabling factor that supports the 
growth of impact investing. The culture of giving in 
Japan, on the other hand, seems weak. This could 
be a key challenge for developing impact investing 
there. 
Social system. The design of social systems, 
meaning the general political and economic 
structures, influences the impact investing 
ecosystem. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) have 
indicated that a nation’s development depends on 
whether their political economic institutions are 
inclusive of society or extractive for the benefits of a 
few elites. Inclusive institutions are more likely to 
promote entrepreneurships and innovations (ibid). 
Likewise, this can enable social innovations and 
social entrepreneurship, further supporting the 
development of impact investing. Based on this 
theory and the analysis of the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (2016), the 
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economic institutions in research are all qualified as 
inclusive. The three countries are ranked in the top 
10 in the world (World Economic Forum, 2016). To 
assess the political institutions, the World Bank’s 
(2016) WGI indicators were applied as standards. 
Japan and the UK’s political institutions are more 
inclusive as they gain positive scores in all WGI 
indicators. Singapore’s political institutions are rather 
extractive, earning negative scores for voice and 
accountability. Japan and the UK, where the 
economic and political institutions are all inclusive, 
are more likely to enable the development of impact 
investing. However, Singapore’s political economic 
environment is a special case. While its political 
power is not well distributed, the government is 
especially efficient. Moreover, the economic 
environment is remarkably enabling. As a result, the 
development of impact investing in Singapore is not 
limited, though it might be more challenging 
politically. 
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E. The Supports Domain 
Intermediaries. Intermediaries are important support 
for the impact investing ecosystem, as they help to 
develop market infrastructures, build capacity, and 
improve market efficiency. The focus of this research 
is to determine whether certain intermediation exists 
between the supply and demand, and to identify 
examples. A list of examples7 for intermediaries is 
presented in four categories (see annex). Through 
this list, this research has collected evidence that 
intermediaries are currently building the capacity of 
impact investing in the UK, Japan, and Singapore, 
with the participation of public, private, and social 
sectors together. The set of intermediaries is different 
for the three countries but organizations with similar 
functions usually exist. In Japan, there seem to be 
fewer public actors involved in market intermediation. 
In the UK, the most important examples of 
                                                             
7The intermediaries in Japan and Singapore are identified by the AVPN 
report (Mohan et al., 2017). Additionally, based on keyword research 
and the information on existing networks, such as the Social 
Investment Forum (UK) and the Global Impact Investment Network, 
examples for the three countries are given. 
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governmental actors include Big Society Capital, 
CDC which provides tailored overseas investment 
support (CDC Group, 2017) and a pilot P2P Impact 
Fund established in 2015 which supports social 
enterprises in accessing crowdfunding platforms 
(Cabinet Office, Government of UK, 2015). In 
Singapore, the National Council of Social Service, 
raiSE, and Tote Board are quasi-governmental 
organizations that provide support to social 
enterprises and the social sector. The philanthropic 
crowdfunding platform “Giving.sg.” has also been 
established by the government. In addition, the 
presence of the social stock exchange platforms in 
Singapore and the UK gives the two countries a 
higher level of intermediation than Japan. 
Platforms and networks. The existence of networks 
and platforms is essential for impact investing as they 
provide information and knowledge that can improve 
communication and build capacity. A list of networks 
and platforms, though not exhaustive, is provided in 
the annex. The three countries have access to 
platforms with similar functions, from global-level 
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networks to regional or local ones. The AVPN report 
has identified the key networks and platforms for 
Singapore and Japan (Mohan et al., 2017). There are 
fifteen organizations listed in Singapore, but only 
seven in Japan. From this aspect, it seems that 
Singapore has more access to impact investing 
networks and platforms. This result suggests that the 
Japanese government could consider putting more 
effort into building infrastructure support for the 
impact investment market, while it is evident that the 
intermediaries, networks and platforms are 
developing in all three countries. 
F. The Finance Domain 
Governments in debt. The government’s financial 
condition can show whether the governmental 
resources are sufficient to address the growing social 
needs. The World Development Indicators provide 
information about the revenue and expenses of the 
governments, as well as the amount of their debt 
(World Bank, 2017c). It is observed that all three 
governments are in debt. This reflects why impact 
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investing is needed in the first place — new solutions 
are essential for society especially given a lack of 
traditional resources. The Japanese government has 
the highest debt (198% GDP) among the three 
countries (ibid). In the UK and Singapore, the 
governmental debts are lower at 107.6% GDP and 
107.2% GDP, yet still higher than the average of 
high-income countries (101.1%) (ibid). In addition, 
the governments of UK and Japan struggle to 
balance their budgets with deficits. Singapore, on the 
other hand, keeps a revenue of 2.2% GDP (ibid). In 
general, there is a demand for impact investing in all 
three countries because they all face insufficient 
governmental resources. Especially the UK and 
Japan could profit from engaging private capital as 
part of the development of impact investing. 
Financial market development. A well-developed 
financial market is more likely to support the 
development of impact investing. Singapore and 
Japan have enabling financial conditions in general 
for impact investing growth similar to the UK. With 
regard to economic development in general, the 
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World Competitiveness Index has shown that all 
three countries are more advanced than the rest of 
the world (World Economic Forum, 2016). Notably, 
Singapore is ranked in the top two in the index, while 
the UK is in the top seven and Japan in the top eight 
(ibid). For financial market development in particular, 
Singapore is ranked second as well, while the UK 
(16th) and Japan (17th) are at about the same level 
(ibid). However, Japan and the UK have advantages 
in market size (ranked fourth, and ninth) in contrast 
to Singapore’s relatively small market (ranked 37th) 
(ibid). Compared with other economies in the world, 
the three countries have relatively efficient, 
trustworthy, and confident market and financial 
systems. The conditions in the two Asian countries 
create an enabling environment for impact investing. 
The smaller market size in Singapore does not limit 
the development of impact investing. 
Financial intermediation for inclusive growth. In 
addition to the general financial market development, 
this research further examines the aspect of inclusive 
economic growth through the “financial 
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intermediation of real economy investment” pillar by 
the World Economic Forum’s (2017) new Inclusive 
Development Index. An inclusive economy enables 
impact investing to grow. The results show that the 
three countries all have medium-high financial 
foundations and environments for inclusive growth. 
Singapore, with the highest score of 5.50 (from 
lowest 1 to highest 7) among the three countries, 
performs in the top 20% among advanced 
economies (World Economic Forum, 2017). The UK 
obtained a score of 4.77 (top 40%), and Japan a 
score of 4.53 (ibid). The financial system inclusion in 
Singapore has room to improve, especially when 
compared with the UK. Namely, it can increase the 
affordability of accessing capital and financial 
services in the country. The financial intermediation 
in Japan is also relatively weak compared with 
Singapore, the UK, and other advanced countries. 
Therefore, the efficiency of intermediation from 
assets to investment opportunities needs to be 
improved to encourage the development of impact 
investing. 
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V. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The proposed impact investing ecosystem 
framework provides a comprehensive overview of 
the actors in the impact investing market and 
identifies its key challenges and possibilities. The 
merge and adaptation of the OECD social impact 
investment framework and the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem approach has proven as an effective 
method since it complements the analytical 
approaches of the two frameworks and allows cross-
country comparisons. In this case study, the 
proposed impact investing ecosystem framework 
has found overall enabling environments in Japan 
and Singapore for the development of impact 
investing, although different challenges exist. While 
the market demand is relatively small compared with 
the UK due to fewer apparent social needs, the two 
Asian countries have similar political economic 
systems, high-quality human resources and well-
developed financial markets. As Japan faces heavy 
debt and social expenditures and Singapore has a 
limited budget for social development, impact 
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investing is beneficial for both countries as a new 
solution to supplement governmental resources. 
Essential intermediaries and networks are already 
developing in both countries to support the market. 
Consequently, impact investing has great potential to 
grow in Japan and Singapore. To maximize this 
potential, public policy plays an important role. 
Firstly, it is essential that the governments 
understand how they can influence every 
determinant of the impact investing ecosystem, e.g. 
the legal frameworks and existing policies. By 
supporting enabling factors in all the different 
domains of this ecosystem, the government can 
catalyze its development. As the benchmark of the 
UK shows, public policy can build market capacity, 
increase demand, encourage investors, and provide 
capital or shape the social systems to invest private 
capital in social services. 
Japan. Japan is a country with high governmental 
social spending. Since it has the highest debt among 
the three countries and cannot balance its budget, 
the government should seek alternative resources to 
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help solve the growing social issues. Therefore, the 
demand for impact investing is high. To promote 
impact investing in Japan, the following suggestions 
for the government are given. Firstly, when 
compared with the other two countries, the key 
challenges are aging, income inequality, 
unemployment, and the environment (especially 
greenhouse gas emissions). The government can 
first examine the current structures of social services 
in these areas and then provide incentives for impact 
investments. Secondly, as the Japanese society has 
a relatively weak social sector, the government 
should put more efforts into building market capacity 
and catalyzing private capital. For example, it can 
become more involved in supporting intermediaries, 
investing in relevant research, or providing training 
programs. Additionally, given Japan’s unique 
donation structure, the government can provide tax 
incentives for the corporate sector to invest in SPOs. 
The government can also focus on mobilizing the 
HNWIs in the country because they offer a rich 
source for impact investing. Thirdly, a legal 
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framework for social enterprises is needed. The 
regulatory quality and rule of law in general are 
relative weaknesses of the Japanese governance 
compared with the other two countries. A clear 
framework will allow the government to create 
tailored tax incentives and attract impact investors. 
Lastly, the Japanese government should consider 
the proposals of the Japan Impact Investment 
Taskforce which provides a comprehensive plan for 
the development of impact investing in Japan. These 
proposals, based on the successful experiences of 
the UK government, can also help to overcome the 
challenge of a weaker social sector. 
Singapore. Singapore has the highest quality and 
quantity of human resources, the most advanced 
financial market, and a government that ranks higher 
on good governance rankings compared to the other 
two countries. Furthermore, it has more access to 
international impact investors as well as international 
and regional impact investing networks than Japan. 
As a result, the impact investing industry in 
Singapore is promising. Impact investments can 
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serve as a great additional resource for solving social 
problems given the fact that the government has a 
limited budget. Based on the analysis of this 
research, the key social challenges are aging, 
welfare for children and families, income inequality 
and environmental issues (especially outdoor air 
pollution, biodiversity, and habitat protection). The 
government can take all domains of the ecosystem 
into consideration to enable impact investing and 
design new interventions that address these 
problems. Singapore can take advantage of the 
access to international networks and financial 
markets to engage impact investors. Additionally, the 
government can establish a research institution to 
gain and provide essential knowledge in the field. 
Lastly, the government can consider introducing 
social impact bonds to promote impact investing. The 
implementation of pilot social impact bonds can 
demonstrate the benefit for society and the cost-
effectiveness for the government which would allow 
Singapore to maintain its low social spending 
strategy. Given the effectiveness and trustworthiness 
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of the Singaporean government, there is great 
potential for these projects to succeed.  
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Colombia, where pilot projects have already been 
designed. However, no impact bonds have been 
implemented yet. This research attempts to identify 
the distinct constraints within each country that 
hinder the adoption and implementation of impact 
bonds through the policy transfer approach. The 
findings show that the constraints are related to the 
politicization by interest groups (Mexico), political 
cycles (Colombia), and the level of the government’s 
centralization (Chile). 
Key words: Development Impact Bonds, Pay for 
Success Contracts, Public Policy, Policy Transfer, 
Social Impact Bonds. 
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I. Introduction 
The pursuit of profits and the solving of social 
problems are usually considered as two opposing 
and incompatible objectives. While mainstream 
investors assume that it is the responsibility of 
governments and charities to tend to social issues, 
traditional philanthropic and civil society 
organizations reject the idea that for-profit 
businesses promote equality, justice, and defending 
social causes. In essence, it is assumed that creating 
economic value is best left to private companies and 
that improving social welfare is best left to 
governments and non-profit organizations (Bugg-
Levine & Emerson, 2011). This view neglects the 
materiality of social and environmental externalities 
of investment decisions.  
The emerging impact investment market indicates 
that the two objectives - make profit and address 
social issues - can be achieved simultaneously 
(internalizing non-market consequences) and that 
they are capable of creating a new investment 
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market that improves social and environmental 
conditions. 
Impact bonds are becoming a popular mechanism of 
the impact investment market to tackle social issues 
and provide financial returns to investors as they use 
an innovative and preventative approach that brings 
together the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, and the government or a donor 
agency. The impact bonds are divided into Social 
Impact Bonds (SIBs) and Development Impact 
Bonds (DIBs). 
The UK initiated the first SIB in 2010, and by the time 
of this research, more than 40 projects, primarily in 
developed countries, have been established. In 
developing countries, DIBs provide a considerable 
alternative for they do not require the government to 
pay for the proposed social outcome and therefore 
avoid budgetary pressures for the government. India 
developed the first DIB in 2015 with the aim of 
increasing the school enrollment of girls. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American 
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Development Bank (IADB) started promoting SIBs 
with resources for technical assistance and feasibility 
studies through the Multilateral Investment Fund 
(MIF). Mexico, Chile and Colombia are the first 
candidate countries in the region to adopt this 
mechanism. However, despite several proposals and 
pilot projects designed in these countries, neither 
SIBs nor DIBs have been applied.  
The primary interest of this research is to assess and 
identify the potential constraints that hinder the 
implementation of SIBs and DIBs in the three Latin 
American countries through the policy transfer 
framework developed by Benson (2009). In this 
context, we evaluate the possible limitations of the 
transfer process on the demand side, the 
programmatic characteristics of the impact bonds, 
the application constraints and the contextual factors 
in the selected countries in order to understand why 
no impact bonds have been implemented so far. The 
UK and India are used as benchmarks to analyze 
their transferability. 
URN (urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201700012) 
 
155 
 
The first section of this paper explains the concept of 
impact bonds. The second section provides the 
methodological framework to identify the potential 
constraints for the transfer of impact bonds to the 
selected countries. The third section analyzes and 
interprets the relevant findings to answer the two 
research questions: Why have no impact bonds been 
implemented yet? Which are the major obstacles for 
their implementation? Finally, the fourth section 
presents the discussion and conclusions.  
II. Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
A. Social Impact Bonds 
Social Impact Bonds (SIB), as one tool of the impact 
investment market, involve six main stakeholders: 
investor(s), an intermediary, a service provider, an 
independent evaluator, and the outcome payer plus 
the target population (see figure 1). The basic design 
of an SIB can be modified depending on the social 
issue and specific contract agreement. 
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The process starts with the private investors, who 
provide the funding to a service provider with the 
necessary expertise to deliver a service that helps 
the target population. The approach of the planned 
intervention is usually preventative instead of 
reactive. If the evaluator validates that the pre-
agreed outcomes of the social service are fulfilled, 
the outcome payer (usually the local or national 
government) repays the investors (sometimes 
depending on the level of success). In most cases, 
the intermediary is in charge of bringing together the 
different actors, discussing the details of the 
transaction and raising capital for the project 
(Goodall, 2014; Instiglio & Thomson Reuters 
Foundation, 2014; Liebman & Sellman, 2013). 
In order to manage the resources and the contracts 
with the different stakeholders, a legal entity called a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE), can be created and included as part of 
the framework (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015; 
Mulgan et al., 2011). Although the SPV does not 
deliver any services, it acts as the lead organization, 
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and carries out such tasks as receiving the capital 
from the private funders, passing the funding to the 
service provider, ensuring the delivery of the 
intervention, managing the contracts with the 
agencies and monitoring their performance, and 
receiving the outcome payments and transferring 
them to the investors. This entity is controlled either 
by the intermediary or the investors. After the 
investors are repaid, the remainders of the outcome 
payments are kept by the owner of the SPV. 
The SIB framework can vary depending on the 
stakeholders, the context, and the agreements on the 
intervention. The contract relation with the outcome 
funder falls into one of the three types described by 
Goodall (2014) and Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2015): 
The first is the managed impact bond structure, in 
which the outcome payer makes a contract with the 
intermediary or a SPV controlled by the intermediary. 
The intermediary plays a leading role through the 
transaction process and is in charge of managing the 
performance of the service delivery. In the 
intermediated structure, the outcome payer makes a 
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contract with the investors or a SPV controlled mainly 
by investors. In this case, the intermediary is still 
responsible for most of the transactions and is 
contracted by the investors or the SPV to supervise 
the performance of the service delivery. The last 
contract relation is the direct structure, in which the 
outcome payer contracts directly with the service 
provider. Furthermore, the outcome payer has the 
leading role and manages the performance of the 
intervention.  
Figure 1. Basic social impact bond model
 
(Source: authors). 
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B. Development Impact Bonds 
The Development Impact Bond (DIB) scheme, as 
another tool of the impact investment market, is 
based on the same principles as the SIB (therefore 
similar to figure 1). The main difference is the role of 
the government and the outcome payer. DIBs are 
designed to be implemented in lower and middle-
income countries4. Depending on the specific 
circumstances in the target country, the government 
may sing a memorandum of understanding with the 
service provider or DIP (see below) which stipulates 
that the goals and the approach of the service 
provider are align with the government’s manifesto. 
But it is usually a foundation, a donor agency, or an 
international organization (with the support of the 
host country) which pays the investors fully or 
                                                             
4 The middle-income countries are classified in lower-middle-income 
economies with a per capita income from $1,026 to $4,035 USD, and 
upper-middle-income economies with a per capita income from $4,036 
to $12,475 USD (UNIDO, 2014; World Bank, 2016a). 
URN (urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201700012) 
 
160 
 
partially once the agreed outcomes have been 
achieved and verified. 
According to the Center for Global Development & 
Social Finance (2013), two basic models can be used 
for a DIB. In the first model, there is a direct contract 
between outcome funders and service providers and 
like in the SIB model, the repayment to the investors 
depends on the achievement of previously agreed 
outcomes. The second model uses a Development 
Impact Partnership (DIP), which is a new corporate 
entity and has a similar function as the Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Special Purpose Entity 
(SPE) in the SIBs. The DIP makes contracts with the 
different parties: the investors, the service providers, 
the outcome payers, the intermediary and sometimes 
the government. It is also responsible for the design 
and implementation of the strategy to deliver the 
desired outcomes. The donor agencies and partner 
governments can be involved as co-commissioners. 
The investors and the DIP make an investment 
agreement regarding the amount of capital needed, 
the timeline, and terms of repayment. The investment 
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capital is transferred to the DIP which uses it to 
finance the service providers’ delivery costs upfront. 
The outcome payers and the DIP make an outcome 
contract and establish the conditions of payment to 
the DIP if the outcomes are achieved (see figure 2). 
The measurement and the validation of the outcomes 
are agreed upon by the outcome payers and an 
independent evaluator that audits the results 
reported from the interventions.  
Figure 2 DIB: Contract via a Development Impact 
Partnership 
 
 (authors, based on Center for Global Development & Social 
Finance, 2013) 
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C. The Policy Transfer Framework 
When a policy or a program is successful or 
promising, other governments hope to achieve 
similar results by adopting it. This is why some SIBs, 
which have their origins in the UK, have already been 
adopted in Europe and the Unites States of America. 
In political science and public policy analysis, this 
process of adopting policies and programs from other 
public bodies is called “policy transfer”. It is 
understood as “the process by which knowledge 
about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or 
present) is used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas 
in another political setting” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, 
p. 6). 
The policy transfer process has four components 
distributed between the demand and the supply side. 
On the demand side, there is the need for a policy or 
program to address a specific issue. The policy-
makers can face this demand by implementing 
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policies from other countries or jurisdictions which 
already have handled a similar problem. The 
exporter jurisdiction where the policy was designed 
represents the supply side. In order to assess 
whether it is feasible to transfer a certain policy it is 
essential to know the conditions and characteristics 
of the program as well as the institutional, political, 
legal, social and economic context of both the 
exporter an importer jurisdiction. (Benson, 2009; 
Page, 2000; Rose, 1993, 2005) 
The assumption that a transfer process will lead to a 
successful policy implementation is not always 
correct (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1993). 
Possible constraints that could hinder the 
implementation are the complexity and uniqueness 
of the policy or program (Rose, 1993), institutional 
and structural impediments, insufficient economic 
and political resources (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), 
cognitive constraints in the pre-decision phase, 
environmental obstacles, and the domestic public 
opinion (Evans, 2009). Constraints can be classified 
into four types: the demand side, the programmatic 
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characteristics of the policy, contextual factors, and 
application constraints (Benson, 2009; Benson & 
Jordan, 2011). Based on the constraints and their 
classification, Benson (2009) proposes an analytical 
framework to examine the transferability of programs 
between contexts. To assess whether a policy 
transfer process could be subject to constraints or 
not, he associated a series of questions to the factors 
that could interfere with the adoption of the policy 
(see table 1). If there are many, difficult constraints 
(high constraints), the chances of a successful policy 
transfer are low and it is therefore advisable to create 
a new policy, though it can be influenced by the 
original policy. However, if there are few, soft 
constraints (low constraints), the policy transfer is 
more likely to be a success and a copy or adaptation 
of the original policy can be implemented. 
 
 
 
URN (urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201700012) 
 
165 
 
Table 1 Factors constraining transferability  
Factors constraining 
transferability 
Key questions 
Demand side constraints 
Policy demand 
Is there a demand for the policy or 
program?  
Is there potential resistance to transfer? 
Programmatic constraints 
Programmatic uniqueness  How unique is the program?  
Programmatic complexity How complex is the program? 
Contextual constraints 
Path dependency  Are past policies restrictive or enabling? 
Existing structures  
Are existing structures restrictive or 
enabling? 
Political context  Is politicization apparent? 
Resources 
Does the receiving context possess 
adequate resources for transfer? 
Application constraints 
Institutional 
substitutability 
Would new institutional structures be 
needed?  
Scales of change 
Is the anticipated scale of change large 
or small? 
Programmatic 
modification  
Are programmatic adjustments needed?  
Source: Authors, based on Benson, 2009 
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D. Methodology 
Identifying the current and potential constraints in the 
adopting countries according to Benson’s analytical 
framework (2009) will be used to assess whether 
SIBs and DIBs could be applied in the selected Latin 
American countries Mexico, Chile and Colombia. 
Furthermore, the current and potential constraints of 
such an implementation will be identified. The 
benchmarks for the research are the UK for the SIB 
and India for the DIB. The UK was chosen because 
it is where the first SIB emerged and it currently has 
the most developed market for impact investing 
across the globe. Furthermore, there is sufficient 
information available regarding the design of SIBs, 
the role of the stakeholders and the evidence of the 
outcomes of the interventions. India was chosen 
because it was the first and only country to fully 
implement a DIB. Although the available information 
is not as abundant, the analysis of its design and 
implementation process are relevant and useful to 
understand how developing countries can use the 
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DIB model and what the necessary conditions for 
adoption are.  
Mexico, Chile and Colombia were chosen as the 
potential adopting countries for this research. They 
were selected because the Multilateral Investment 
Fund (MIF) and the innovation lab for the Inter-
American Development Bank group have considered 
them among the early candidates for the 
implementation of SIBs in Latin America, and 
because they already have SIB projects in an 
advanced design stage (Levey, 2014).  
The analysis of possible constraints of the adoption 
of SIBs and DIBs in Mexico, Chile and Colombia is 
guided by the key questions formulated by Benson in 
2009 (see table 1). On the demand side, the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database by the 
World Bank (2016b) will be used to analyze specific 
issues like youth unemployment, primary and 
secondary school attendance, and the prevalence of 
diabetes. These social issues were chosen because 
they represent current conditions and basic needs 
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that are not being met, and because there are 
potential impact bond projects to address them. 
Further information will derive from the Gini 
coefficient by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2014) which 
represents the income inequality, and the human 
development index (HDI) by the United Nations 
Development Program (2015). The programmatic 
constraints will be assessed by analyzing the 
structure of the SIB and the DIB models themselves. 
Regarding the contextual constraints, the following 
issues will be evaluated: the existence or absence of 
a legal framework for the adoption of impact bonds in 
Mexico, Chile and Colombia; factors such as rule of 
law, control of corruption, political stability, and 
government effectiveness from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) created by the World 
Bank for the period 2009 – 2014 (2015); the political 
context and politicization of private interventions in 
social areas; the status of public resources in social 
policies, the number of potential service providers, 
and potential investors. Regarding the application 
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constraints, we will analyze the institutional 
structures of the three countries, such as the legal 
frameworks necessary to adopt an impact bond. The 
analysis is based on a review of the legal frameworks 
for SIBs in developing countries by Instiglio and the 
Thompson Foundation (2014). The methodological 
limitations of this research are related to the 
availability of comparable data about the exporting 
and adopting countries. Furthermore, there is much 
less information available with regard to the DIB in 
India compared to the SIBs in the UK. 
III. Results 
A. Demand side constraints 
The social needs in a country represent the demand 
side of a policy transfer. However, the interest and 
willingness of the policy-makers to satisfy this 
demand is crucial. 
Is there a demand for the program? Yes. There is a 
demand for programs and policies that cover social 
needs in the three Latin American countries.  
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First, there is a large income inequality within their 
population. While the average Gini coefficient 
measured by the OECD is 0.31, Mexico and Chile 
have the highest income inequality among the OECD 
countries (0.47 and 0.50 resp.). Colombia, which 
does not belong to the OECD, has a Gini coefficient 
of 0.53, which shows an even higher income 
inequality compared to Mexico and Chile (World 
Bank, 2016). The UK, as a reference, has a Gini 
coefficient of 0.34. The Gini coefficient of India was 
0.35 in 2011. 
The second big issue examined is unemployment, 
and especially youth unemployment. In the period 
from 2010 to 2014, the mean unemployment rate in 
the UK was 7.5% and the mean youth unemployment 
rate 19.6%, whereas the mean unemployment rate in 
India was 3.5% and the mean youth unemployment 
rate was 10.4%. Mexico and Chile have relatively low 
unemployment rates like India (5% and 6.8% resp.), 
but while the average youth unemployment rate is 
9.6% in Mexico and 16.9% in Chile. Only Colombia 
shows a higher rate of unemployment and youth 
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unemployment than the UK in the same period of 
time (10.6% and 20.7% resp.). 
The third issue examined concerns the education 
sector. In the period from 2010 to 2013, the UK 
showed the highest enrollment of children in primary 
school among the selected countries in this study. 
The rate of unenrolled children was below 1%, the 
rate of unenrolled adolescents below 2%. In Mexico, 
the average rate of children not enrolled in primary 
school is 3.2%, but the average rate of adolescents 
who do not attend school is 12.6%. In Colombia, the 
percentage of children out of primary school is 3.1% 
and the percentage of adolescents out of secondary 
school is only 0.9% - however, the last available 
information is a database from 2009. Chile has the 
greatest percentage of unenrolled children in primary 
school (6.1%), but it shows a low rate of adolescent 
school drop outs (1.7%). In India, the rate of children 
unenrolled in primary school is 5.1%, but the 
percentage of adolescent school drop outs goes up 
to 23.2%. 
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The last examined issue is the prevalence of 
diabetes as one aspect of health care. In 2015, the 
prevalence of diabetes in Mexico, Chile and 
Colombia was 15.8%, 10% and 10% resp. In India, 
9.3% of the population has diabetes, while the UK 
shows the lowest prevalence of the disease with 
4.7%.  
In summary, there is a demand for action on all the 
studied issues, though each country faces different 
challenges and priorities, such as income inequality 
in Colombia or primary school attendance in Chile.  
Is there potential resistance to transfer the program? 
No. There does not seem to be any resistance from 
the policy-makers neither in Mexico, Chile nor 
Colombia. Since 2014, the three countries have 
attended meetings organized by the Multilateral 
Investment Fund (MIF) which aim to promote the use 
of SIBs in this region. The MIF focuses on developing 
the right conditions for growing the impact investment 
market, identifying social needs and possible 
interventions, assessing the legal framework, and 
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providing training and advisory support to the 
interested stakeholders in the model (Multilateral 
Investment Fund, 2014). Mexico, Chile and Colombia 
have shown their interest in the use of SIBs, and are 
considered as the main candidates to focus 
resources on the development of impact bonds 
(Levey, 2014). The three countries even started to 
design projects. In Mexico, the state of Jalisco 
explored possible interventions to move single 
mothers permanently out of poverty, while Instiglio (a 
highly active intermediary in Latin America) 
conducted feasibility studies concerning the 
reduction of crime recidivism in Chile, and the 
reduction of school dropouts and teenage 
pregnancies in Colombia (Bloomgarden & Levey, 
2015).  
B. Programmatic Constraints 
When a policy or a program present a high degree of 
complexity, they are less likely to be successfully 
transferred to another country. In the case of the 
impact bonds, the complexity does not show in the 
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concept, but rather in the details of the interventions 
themselves, which vary from one context to another.  
How unique is the program? SIBs and DIBs do not 
have elements of “uniqueness” in the sense that 
Rose (1993, 2005) describes, as their 
implementation is not restricted to a specific place 
and target population that only exists in a determined 
space and time. SIBs have already been transferred 
and applied to various scenarios, in spite of the 
different contexts and the social issues in the 
adopting countries. If there is a social issue or a 
vulnerable population that can be addressed by a 
preventative and innovative approach, private 
investors who are interested in financing the model, 
service providers with the adequate expertise, and a 
government with the commitment and resources to 
pay for the outcomes, you can develop an SIB. 
However, if the budgetary capacity does not allow a 
government to be the outcome payer, but there are 
socially motivated private outcome payers, then a 
DIB is an alternative option. Such features are 
commonly found in low and middle-income countries 
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(Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 
2013). Both SIBs and DIBs are flexible and 
adjustable as long as the stakeholders and the legal 
and institutional frameworks within a country or 
jurisdiction enable the implementation.  
How complex is the program? The degree of 
programmatic complexity, according to Rose (1993, 
2005), can be assessed based on the following 
features: multiple goals, a vague empirical focus, 
multiple causes for a desired outcome, unfamiliarity 
with the original design, and unpredictability of the 
outcomes. If these features are present, then the 
program has a high degree of complexity which 
makes it difficult to be transferred. 
The ability to adopt the SIB model depends on the 
state of knowledge of the adopting country. Until 
February 2015, Mexico, Chile and Colombia have 
taken part in the communications strategy and SIB 
events organized by the MIF (Multilateral Investment 
Fund, 2015), which means they are familiar with the 
mechanism. The complexity of the DIB model is 
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similar to the SIB, as the only difference is the role of 
the outcome payer, but the model is not explicitly 
disseminated in any of the selected countries. With 
regard to the aspect of unpredictable outcomes, it 
can be said that SIBs and DIBs usually use 
interventions offered by service providers which have 
already proven their effectiveness in the past, so the 
risk for unpredictable outcomes is limited. 
Furthermore, the outcomes-orientation and the data-
based approach of the impact bonds reduce the 
uncertainties related to multiple goals, vague 
empirical focus or multiple causes for a desired 
outcome.  
C. Contextual constraints 
A policy or a program might be unsuccessful if the 
context of the adopting countries restricts its 
functionality. Factors, such as the socioeconomic 
structure, political context, path dependency or 
availability of resources, can turn into obstacles if 
they do not match the conditions of the exporter 
country. 
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Path dependency: Are past policies restrictive or 
enabling the transfer process? Neither Mexico, Chile 
nor Colombia have a specific law that provides direct 
references to impact bonds. However, these 
countries have laws on Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) that can be used for the contracts and 
agreements between the government and the 
intermediary or service providers in an SIB (Honjiyo, 
2015).  
A review of the legal frameworks in developing 
countries made by Instiglio and the Thomson 
Reuters Foundation shows that there is legal 
leverage for all the stakeholders to take part in the 
SIB model in Mexico (2014). The review of the 
Chilean legal structure shows that the political and 
administrative authorities on a subnational level have 
a relatively low autonomy to contract with third 
parties (Ibid). Due to the centralized governmental 
structure, any negotiation has to be made by the 
central government, and local governments act 
primarily as agents that are not allowed to make their 
own policy decisions (Gatica, 2015; Von Baer & 
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Torralbo, 2012). In Colombia, although SIBs are not 
specified in the legal framework, the current 
legislation allows contracts and agreements between 
the private and public sector, which can be used for 
the implementation of impact bonds (Instiglio & 
Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014). 
Existing structures: Are existing structures restrictive 
or enabling? Using data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), four factors were 
chosen to compare the performance of the existing 
structures in the selected countries with the 
benchmarks for the SIB and the DIB. These factors 
are the rule of law, control of corruption, political 
stability and absence of violence, and government 
effectiveness in the period from 2009 to 2014. The 
WGI uses percentile ranks to indicate a country's 
position among the countries covered by the WGI 
project; a percentile value of 0 corresponds to the 
lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank, which 
means the greater the percentile rank, the better the 
performance. 
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The rule of law factor shows to what extent the 
agents have confidence in society and to what 
degree they abide by its rules, including contract 
enforcement, property rights, police, courts and the 
likelihood of crime. Mexico and Colombia have lower 
percentile ranks than India (35.34 and 43.47 
respectively versus 53.52). Chile on the other hand 
shows a relatively high performance (87.90), 
comparable with the UK (93.52). 
The control of corruption factor describes society’s 
perception regarding the use of public power for 
private gain on both a small and large scale, and the 
degree to which the state is influenced by elites and 
private interests. Mexico and Colombia have low 
percentile ranks (40.59 and 44.50 resp.), but slightly 
better than India (36.40). Again, Chile has a high 
percentile rank (90.37), comparable to the UK 
(92.20). 
The political stability and absence of violence and 
terrorism factor measures society’s perception of 
how likely it is to have political instability and/or 
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politically motivated violence, as well as terror 
attacks. Mexico shows a low performance (22.95), 
but performs better than India (12.12). Colombia has 
the lowest percentile rank (9.19). Chile performs 
better than the UK (63.42 versus 58.20). 
The government effectiveness factor indicates 
society’s perception of the quality of public services, 
the civil service and its independence from political 
pressures, policy formulation and implementation, as 
well as the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. Colombia has an 
average percentile rank of 53.54, which is higher 
than India (51.22), but lower than Mexico (61.75) and 
much lower than Chile (85.74). The UK reference 
percentile is 91.39. 
Referring to low performance ranks according to the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from 2009 
to 2014, the existing structures in Mexico and 
Colombia could restrict the transfer process, 
whereas Chile seems to have very enabling 
structures. 
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Political context: Is there obvious politicization? 
According to Marta Garcia, a director at Social 
Finance and leader of impact bond projects in Latin 
America, the private interventions in the public sector 
can be politicized by interest groups, the political 
cycle or internal conflicts (personal communication, 
June 9, 2016). A SIB in the public healthcare system 
in Mexico did not take place because it was opposed 
by the National Union of Social Security Workers 
(SNTSS). In Chile and Colombia, SIBs were delayed 
due to political elections. 
There has not been any attempt to use a DIB in 
Mexico, Colombia or Chile yet, but it can be assumed 
that there are fewer constraints in the political context 
for this model than in the SIB, since the government 
has a much smaller role in the scheme. In Mexico, 
the DIB does not seem to have obstacles unless 
there is some political interest group taking part in the 
provision on a social service. In Chile and Colombia, 
the delay of the adoption of impact bonds has been 
due to political issues from the government, rather 
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than the private sector or civil society organizations, 
so a similar assumption can be made. 
Resources: Does the receiving context possess 
adequate resources for the transfer process? The 
resources used on an SIB or DIB depend on the 
agreements and the budgetary capacity of the private 
investors and the public sector/alternative outcome 
payer. Furthermore, the number of service providers 
is a relevant factor to ease the transfer of an impact 
bond.  
The use of public resources shows the capacity and 
interest of governments to improve the living 
conditions of their population. The average public 
expenditure on education is 5.1% of the GDP in 
Mexico, 4.6% in Colombia and 4.3% in Chile, which 
is more than in India (3.5%), but less than in the UK 
(5.6%). In regard to healthcare, the government 
expenditure as a percentage of the GDP is 11.4% in 
Mexico, 14.6% in Chile and 18.2% in Colombia, 
which exceeds 4.5% in India. The UK allocates 
16.2% of their GDP to the healthcare system. 
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With respect to the investments needed to fund 
impact bonds, the attraction of investors plays a 
crucial role. In Latin America, impact investing is 
gaining traction. According to the Annual Impact 
Investor Survey, the region is one of the leading 
areas in terms of allocated capital, and investors 
have expressed strong interest in increasing the 
investment amount in 2016 (GIIN, 2016). Currently, 
the region has 11% of the global impact investing 
assets under management, approximately US$6.6 
billion (Ibid).  
Mexico, Chile and Colombia have a well-developed 
environment in regard to third sector organizations. 
According to the International Center for Not-for-
Profit Law, the non-profit sector in Mexico is 
composed of 19,777 active civil associations and 
3,135 private assistance institutions (2016). Chile 
has approximately 31,399 non-profit organizations 
classified as NGOs, according to the National 
Register of Legal Entities (Ministerio Secretaría 
General de la Presidencia, 2013; Soto Coronado, 
2013). According to the Confederación Colombiana 
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de ONGs, in Colombia there are 71,789 non-profit 
organizations (2016). These organizations can be 
involved as service providers in the impact bonds 
scheme in different areas. 
D. Application constraints 
Application constraints refer to necessary changes in 
the institutional structures of the adopting country on 
the one hand or the suggested program on the other 
hand.  
Institutional substitutability: Would new institutional 
structures be needed?  In the case of SIBs, it would 
not be necessary to create new institutional 
structures. The current legal framework considering 
the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme in 
Mexico could be used for the implementation of SIBs 
in the country. Similarly, in Chile, the framework for 
the PPS5 can be used for the adoption of the SIB 
                                                             
5 Public Procurement System of Chile (PPS), Sistema de Compras 
Públicas in Spanish 
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model. In Colombia, two specific laws6 on public-
private contracts constitute the appropriate legal 
framework to introduce SIBs, either as part of a direct 
assignation or a public tender process. In case of the 
DIBs, there is no necessity to create any new 
institutional structure, since the agreement is 
between private entities, whereas the government 
does not take a leading role in the structure, besides 
the memorandum of understanding. 
Scales of change: Is the anticipated scale of change 
large or small? The MIF, together with Social Finance 
(non-profit organization, pioneer on SIBs) is working 
on the capacity building of intermediaries and 
governments providing information and training with 
focus on the benefits of SIBs and the different sectors 
where they can be used. Depending on the gained 
level of knowledge, the design of governmental 
policies will change, as the authorities may focus on 
the outcomes of social service projects as well as 
                                                             
6 See: Instiglio & Thomson Reuters Foundation (2014). Law 1150. Law 
1508 on Public-Private Partnerships or Article 355 of the Colombian 
Constitution. 
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building alliances and cooperative agreements with 
the non-profit and private sectors. With regard to 
DIBs, the expected changes for the government are 
only small scale since its only task is the 
memorandum of understanding with the service 
providers and the evaluator (Marta Garcia, personal 
communication, June 6, 2016).  
Programmatic modification: Are programmatic 
adjustments needed? The specific interventions as 
such cannot be copied, they have to be adapted 
according to the circumstances where they are 
implemented. An unaltered education DIB, like the 
one in India, will not have the same effect and 
outcomes in Mexico, Chile or Colombia, where the 
causes and conditions of the same social issue can 
be different. However, the structure of the impact 
bond itself does not need any alteration, as long as 
the stakeholders are interested in the model and 
have a positive impact on the conditions that enable 
its adoption. 
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IV. Discussion 
In Mexico, there are factors that enable the transfer 
process of impact bonds, but also some political 
factors that can potentially restrict their successful 
implementation. As previously explained, the country 
has social needs that can be tackled by impact bonds 
and there is a demand for policies and programs 
concerning (youth) unemployment, dropouts of 
primary and secondary school and the population 
with diabetes. 
The factors enabling the transfer process of impact 
bonds in Mexico are: cooperation and interest from 
the government, adaptability of the models, legal 
structure, and the conditions and resources of the 
potential stakeholders. There is no apparent 
resistance to the use of SIBs from the side of the 
government and most likely this also applies for the 
DIBs, since the government would spend less 
resources and be less involved than in the SIB 
model. There are no programmatic constraints within 
the structure of the impact bonds. The Mexican law 
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on PPPs enables the adoption and implementation 
of SIBs, and although the law is not specific, the 
contracts could be concluded. Nevertheless, a legal 
specification on the SIB model would be advisable. 
In case of the DIBs, there would be a contract 
between private entities, with the recognition of such 
contract by the state and the memorandum of 
understanding accordingly. For impact bonds in 
general, Mexico has a well-developed environment 
of third sector organizations that can take part as 
service providers. Impact investments are growing in 
the country, and those resources could be allocated 
to impact bond projects.  
The structural constraints of the transfer of impact 
bonds to Mexico are related to factors such as rule of 
law, control of corruption, political stability and 
absence of violence. The low performance 
(according to the percentile rank by the WGI) for the 
rule of law in Mexico implies that the conditions 
concerning contract enforcement, property rights, 
courts and the police, can potentially hinder the 
implementation and performance of SIBs and DIBs. 
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Furthermore, the recent violence in the country - due 
to the war on drugs - could discourage investors and 
service providers to work in some areas of the 
country.  
Besides the structural constraints, the politicization in 
Mexico plays a decisive role. The main problem fields 
are public healthcare and education, which both have 
the largest labor unions in Latin America: the SNTSS 
in the healthcare and social security sector, and the 
National Educational Workers Union (SNTE) and the 
National Coordinator of Education Workers (CNTE) 
in the public education system. In politicized sectors, 
the risk of an opposition towards impact bonds by 
interest groups can be high. If an impact bond is 
implemented in such sectors, the interest groups 
have to be informed about the process of the 
intervention and its goals in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings. It is important to make clear that 
impact bonds are not intended as a substitute or 
replacement for the public services provision, but as 
a complementary preventative approach to the 
governmental functions. In the state of Chiapas, the 
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performance-based pilot contract designed by 
Instiglio to increase high school enrollment does not 
have any opposition because it does not compete 
with the teachers or the institutions. Also, the pilot 
SIB to lift single mothers out of poverty in the state of 
Jalisco has not faced any controversy because it 
complements – not substitutes - a current 
governmental program, where they receive a direct 
transfer of resources.  
In the Chilean context, many factors seem to enable 
the transfer of impact bonds in general, though the 
SIB model seems more suitable than a DIB. Although 
Chile has the highest income inequality among the 
OECD countries, the HDI is higher than in all the 
other Latin American countries, except for Argentina. 
Its social conditions and policy demands are more 
similar to developed countries than developing 
countries. However, there is a demand for programs 
related to youth unemployment, primary school drop 
outs and diabetes prevention. 
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The factors that enable the transfer of impact bonds 
in Chile are the current legal structures and the 
apparent lack of political instability and application 
constraints. SIBs can be adopted through the Public 
Procurement System of Chile (PPS). Although the 
PPS does not specify the use of SIBs, it can be used 
to enforce the contract between the public and the 
private sector. Nevertheless, a specific law on SIBs 
would be advisable. A DIB would not require the PPS 
framework because it constitutes a private contract 
between the investors and the outcome payer, 
together with the memorandum of understanding by 
the government. Chile has a high ranking (according 
to the WGI) in regard to contract enforcement and 
property rights, a low likelihood of crime, and the 
public has a positive perception of the courts, police, 
and control of corruption. The perception of political 
stability and absence of violence is even higher than 
in the UK. There is also a rather positive perception 
with regard to the government's commitment to its 
policies, the public and civil services and the policy 
formulation.  
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It seems that the biggest constraint has been the high 
level of centralization of the government. The local 
governments are not competent to take part in the 
SIB scheme. Only the central government, through 
the Ministry of Finance, which allocates budgets and 
is responsible for the efficient use of public 
resources, can agree to the implementation of an SIB 
(Gatica, 2015). Another aspect seems to be a lack of 
political will from the government. Although a 
feasibility study on a project on crime recidivism 
started in 2014, there is yet no binding commitment 
from the central government and the negotiations 
have been delayed repeatedly due to electoral 
processes in 2016 and 2017. An implementation 
before 2018 is unlikely. 
In Colombia, the factors that enable the transfer of 
the impact bonds model are the demand for 
programs and policies to solve social issues, the low 
resistance to this mechanism and the legal 
framework. There is a demand for action concerning 
(youth) unemployment, school drop outs and 
diabetes. There is a low resistance to the introduction 
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of pilot SIBs presented by Instiglio and the projects 
were considered by both the local and national 
government as they address a better child education, 
unemployed youths, and youths in vulnerable 
situations, which is coherent to the demands shown 
in this research.  
Although the country has a low performance with 
regards to the rule of law and the control of 
corruption, the implementation of impact bonds is 
possible. The medium performance of the 
government’s effectiveness is an enabling factor, 
since the investors can trust that the government will 
repay them if the pre-established outcomes are 
achieved. 
The current legal framework allows the 
implementation of SIBs, though not specified in the 
legislation. The contracts between the public and 
private sector can take place as established by the 
PPP regulation, the regulation on procurement with 
public resources and the direct contracting of non-
profit entities focused on activities of public interest 
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and social development. Similar to the cases of 
Mexico and Chile, SIBs are strongly promoted in 
Colombia, but there have been no intentions to 
introduce DIBs.  
The restrictive factors that have delayed the 
implementation of SIBs in Colombia are related to 
political cycles as well as the potential instability and 
violence in the country. As in the case of Chile, the 
lack of commitment from the government has 
hindered further conversations about SIB projects. 
Pilot projects to reduce teenage pregnancy and 
improve educational outcomes for adolescents in the 
region of Antioquia started in 2012, but have not yet 
been implemented. A project to improve the 
employability of vulnerable youths has not taken 
place either, although it has already proven its 
effectiveness through a pilot project that is expected 
to be scaled soon. Out of the five analyzed countries, 
Colombia has the lowest rating concerning political 
stability and absence of violence, which could 
discourage investors and hinder the work of service 
providers, like in Mexico. However, the country has 
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shown great advances in security measures since 
the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the peace treaty 
with the paramilitary under the Uribe administration 
and the peace treaty with the guerillas under the 
current President Juan Manuel Santos in 2016, are 
likely to reduce the restrictive character of this factor. 
V. Conclusions  
Impact bonds are capable of aligning financial 
rewards with social outcomes, and bringing together 
the expertise of the public, private and third sector to 
work on the same goal, despite their different 
backgrounds and incentives. Among the benefits of 
impact bonds are the potential savings for the 
government, the stable access to resources for the 
third sector, and the financial and social motivation of 
the investors. Due to the preventative approach of 
SIB intervention models, the public sector can save 
resources because the program or policy will help 
reduce the public expenditures on social problems in 
the future. In the DIB model, although the 
government is not an outcome payer, it benefits from 
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the improvement of the quality of life of its population. 
The third sector organizations obtain stable 
resources to perform their social activities, and 
hereby get the opportunity to be innovative. Lastly, 
the private sector obtains a rate of return – if the 
expected outcomes are achieved - and accomplishes 
the goal to make a positive impact on society.  
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Multilateral 
Investment Fund has promoted the use of SIBs, 
since it considers them suitable for the region, 
meanwhile they have ignored DIBs as an alternative. 
In general terms, the structure and features of the 
SIB and the DIB model can be used in Mexico, Chile 
or Colombia. The major obstacles for the adoption of 
impact bonds are related to the politicization by 
interest groups in Mexico, the political cycles in 
Colombia, and the level of the government’s 
centralization in Chile. The implementation of both 
social and development impact bonds in the three 
Latin American countries should be promoted 
insistently with the aim of reducing social issues 
while saving governmental resources. Furthermore, 
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the policy-makers should address the individual 
restraints of the application of the impact bond model 
in their country, as identified in this study. 
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Debt Portfolios of the Poor: The 
Case of Street Vendors in Cali, 
Colombia1 
Lina Martinez2, Juan David Rivera Acevedo3 
Abstract 
The informal economy plays a significant role in the 
job market in Colombia. Cali, the third largest city in 
Colombia, is characterized by a high percentage of 
socially and economically vulnerable population 
groups who take part in the urban informal economy, 
with street vending as their primary source of income. 
This paper studies the socioeconomic dimensions of 
street vendors in Cali. In particular, it examines why 
they are unable to escape poverty and capitalize on 
their comparatively high earnings, despite a minimal 
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tax burden due to the unregulated nature of their 
work and benefits from government welfare. The 
analysis is based on two surveys with 637 
participants and 300 participants respectively. The 
study shows that most of the street vendors do not 
have access to formal banking systems. 
Consequently, they usually depend on payday loans 
with much higher interest rates which absorb a large 
share of their income and perpetuate their 
indebtedness, preventing them from improving their 
living conditions. However, the daily cash flow of 
street vending masks the high opportunity cost of 
loans and long-term deficits.  
Keywords— Colombia, informal economy, payday 
loans, public policy, street vendors. 
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I. Introduction 
The informal economy is of particular importance in 
developing countries around the world. People who 
work in the informal economy already face numerous 
challenges (e.g. low educational level, poor 
economic background) and they are exposed to 
further social and financial difficulties due to the non-
regulated character of the informal sector. In our 
paper, we examine the informal economic activity of 
street vendors in the city of Cali in Colombia. The 
research question driving this research is: why are 
street vendors not likely to improve their living 
conditions despite certain benefits from the 
government, as well as a comparatively high 
income? Our hypothesis is that the main reason why 
street vendors are unable to improve their living 
conditions is that they are generally excluded from 
the formal banking system, therefore, their main 
source of capital is payday loans offered by 
moneylenders at predatory interest rates which 
maintain a vicious cycle of indebtedness.  In the first 
section, we describe the theoretical framework of the 
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informal economy with focus on Colombia, including 
the political background and the characteristics of 
street vending. In the second section, we explain the 
data and methods to test our hypothesis. The study 
was divided in three complementary parts 
(observation only and two different questionnaires) 
and implemented between December 2014 (study 1) 
and April 2016 (study 3). We examined the 
socioeconomic profile as well as the debt portfolio of 
street vendors at two different markets in Cali – the 
Downtown market and the Santa Helena market. In 
the third section, we present the results of our 
analysis. The obtained data on street vendors is not 
only compared between the two sites, but also with 
the average working population in Cali as a reference 
value. After a discussion of the results in the fourth 
section, we present our conclusions. 
II. Theoretical Background 
There is no consensus on the definition of “informal 
economy”. Generally speaking, the term is used with 
reference to employment outside formal regulatory 
arrangements, either in law or in practice (ILO, 2014). 
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The International Labor Organization (ILO) considers 
informal economic activities all those that are not 
covered –or insufficiently covered- by formal 
arrangements that grant workers access to 
government protection, rights and representation 
(Gómez, 2016). The term ‘off the books’ is frequently 
used because it embodies the non-regulated nature 
of the sector outside of formal regulation and beyond 
the taxation regime (Vanek et al., 2012, 2014).  
The informal economy plays an essential role in the 
urban economies of the global South (Bromley 1978; 
Chen 2005, 2012; Godfrey 2011). In Latin America, 
it represents nearly half of the non-agricultural 
employment amongst the working age population 
(Gomez, 2016).  
Colombia follows the Latin American pattern. About 
half of the working age population obtains their 
income through an informal economic activity 
(DANE, 2015). During the past two decades, the 
reduction of the informal sector has been at the top 
of the policy agenda. Several laws and institutional 
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reforms have been enacted. Between 2009 and 
2012, 1.7 million informal workers were integrated 
into the formal economy, and the number of citizens 
contributing to health and retirement systems 
increased by 23.5% and 24.3% respectively. Despite 
these efforts, the proportion of non-agricultural 
informal employment could only be reduced by three 
percentage points -from 58% to 55%- between 2009 
and 2013 (Gómez, 2016).  
The term “informal economy” covers a wide range of 
economic activities, from garbage collection or street 
vending by an individual to small companies with less 
than five employees (ILO-FORLAC, 2014). Our 
analysis focuses on the sector of street vending 
because of its role in the dynamics of the urban 
informal economy and the relevance on the public 
agenda concerning poverty reduction and urban 
planning (Bhowmik 2012; Bromely 2000; Cross, 
2000).  
From a theoretical standpoint, the informal economy 
has been studied from four perspectives: i) legalist, 
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ii) voluntarist, iii) structuralist, and iv) dualist. The 
legalist perspective refers to all regulations and costs 
imposed by governments that inhibit small 
entrepreneurs from entering regulated and formal 
economic activities (Becker, 2004). The voluntarist 
perspective focuses on the deliberated decision 
made by informal workers to avoid taxations and 
regulations (Chen, 2012). The structuralist 
perspective argues that the informal economy is a 
subsidiary sector of the formal economy that allows 
reducing costs and sustains economic growth 
(Portes and Haller, 2004). The dualist standpoint 
considers the existence of the informal economy as 
an outlet to provide income generation to the poor 
(Chen, 2012). Empirical analyses that have studied 
the dynamic of street vending in Colombia, 
concluded that the voluntarist and dualist perspective 
are deeply intertwined in this context (Martínez, et al, 
2017). 
Street vending regulation in Colombia has a long 
history dating back to the 1930’s, when the 
government elicited a legal framework concerning 
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the control and regulation of its expansion. This 
regulatory system remained in effect until 2003. 
Under this framework, street vending was deemed 
an illegal appropriation of public space and local 
governments were granted the capacity to evict 
street vendors from their vending site and confiscate 
their merchandise (Donovan, 2008). In 2003, the 
Constitutional Court revised this legal framework. 
Since then, street vendors have been protected by 
law, and their eviction from public space is prohibited, 
unless they are offered equivalent or better income 
generation opportunities. Consequently, removing 
street vendors from public space has become very 
costly for local governments. Given the lack of 
resources to provide stable jobs or equivalent 
income, the occupation of public space to sell goods 
has expanded in large cities in the country (Martínez 
& Short, 2017).  
Street vendors in Colombia are economically and 
socially vulnerable by many standards. They suffer 
from poor access to education and their job provides 
both an unstable income and harsh working 
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conditions. Furthermore, they tend to be excluded 
from formal economic structures, like regulated 
banking systems and retirement plans. These 
conditions have been reported in different developing 
regions around the world (Cross, 2000; Swanson, 
2007; Chen, 2001). The exclusion of street vendors 
from the formal banking system is due to various 
circumstances. For one, they often do not meet 
certain formal requirements for raising a credit such 
as formal employment and a co-debtor that can 
prove financial stability. Furthermore, in the market 
of credits, the supply curve has a U shape due to 
asymmetric information and transaction cost which 
offers low interest rates for rich people (see figure 1: 
ro in competitive markets or rm without competition) 
but excludes poor people from formal loans (Ashta, 
2009). Therefore, the only outlet for accessing formal 
credit for street vendors is through micro-financing 
schemes but in many cases, those small credits are 
tied to business plans that street vendors are not in 
the capacity to develop. Apart from this, holding a 
bank account in Colombia generally involves activity 
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fees (withdrawal and deposits) which can be difficult 
to afford. Further reasons are the relatively long time 
frame required to access a loan and the perception 
that the bank will reject them anyway (Bhowmik & 
Saha, 2013; Pérez-González et al., 2015). In the 
absence of a regulated banking system, the black 
market of payday loans is dominant, because of 
lower transaction costs and information asymmetry 
due to their closeness to the community and the 
potential use of force (Ashta, 2009). As a result, 
moneylenders are able to push down the supply 
curve for poorer borrowers but charge much higher 
interest rates than a formal bank (see figure 1: 
rpaydayloans c in competition or rpaydayloans m without 
competition) (ibid). There is evidence that payday 
loans in Colombia are linked to criminal organizations 
(Miranda, 2016). As the only resort for easy credit, 
street vendors are exposed to outrageous interest 
rates and the violence displayed by criminal 
organizations in the country. 
The decision of the Colombian government to allow 
street vending as a tool to help eradicate poverty and 
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protect vulnerable populations has led to the 
development of urban economic dynamics that 
incentivize informality but also facilitate the exclusion 
from regulated and institutional structures, like 
banking. Though not illegal, street vending remains a 
non-regulated economic activity. Thus, government 
efforts to control and reduce the expansion of 
informal markets are still challenging. In contrast to 
the idea of supporting the poor, street vending also 
led to negative consequences because of the 
demonstrated links with organizations which profit 
from tax evasion, the mafia, loan sharks and 
smuggling (Revista Semana, 2016).  
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Figure 1. Formal and informal credit market 
 
Source: Authors, adapted from (Ashta, 2009) 
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III. Data and Methods 
Our study was conducted in Cali, the third largest city 
in Colombia with 2.4 million inhabitants. The city is 
one of the main industrial centers of the country and 
the major economic hub in the Pacific region. Cali fits 
in the general pattern of urbanization in Latin 
America where demographic changes and large 
migrations into cities have created an environment of 
poverty and inequality, yet with the potential for many 
economic opportunities (Cohen, 2006). 
According to the Cali planning department, there are 
nine street vending sites in the city, though the exact 
number of street vendors who work at each site is 
unknown. Government interventions focus on the two 
largest street vending sites, the Downtown market 
area, and the Santa Helena market. Downtown 
covers 13 blocks in the middle of the economic and 
political center of the city. Street vendors in this area 
are located along main roads and next to formal 
commerce buildings and storefronts. They offer a 
wide variety of articles such as clothing, footwear, 
accessories, games/toys and food among other 
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products. Santa Helena (3.5 km away from the 
Downtown) is primarily a street food market located 
near one of the most violent and distressed areas of 
Cali. It covers about 12 blocks where formal and 
informal commerce coexist.  
This paper is based on three studies conducted at 
these two sites. The studies were implemented by 
the Observatory of Public Policy (POLIS) at the 
Universidad Icesi in Cali. The first study took place 
Downtown in December 2014. During the first stage, 
observational data was collected using a structured 
guide regarding the type of stall (fixed or mobile), 
type of products offered and number of people 
working at each stall. 792 vendors were counted at 
the site during this phase. In a second stage, 
pollsters were hired to conduct a detailed survey with 
68 structured questions concerning socioeconomic 
status, family composition, income (including sales 
and profits), indebtedness, education, life 
satisfaction and access to government welfare. The 
survey was completed by 527 street vendors. The 
respondents were randomly selected in all blocks of 
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the market, and the survey was conducted while they 
were at their stall. The pollsters approached the 
respondents by explaining the objective of the study, 
assuring confidentiality and emphasizing that the 
acquired data would be used for academic purposes 
only. Also, it was made clear that participation was 
voluntary and they could stop the survey at any time.  
The second study was conducted in Santa Helena in 
January and February 2016. The same methodology 
and questionnaire were used as at the Downtown 
site. 245 vendors were counted at the site during the 
observational phase. 112 randomly selected 
respondents took part in the above mentioned 
socioeconomic survey.  
As suggested by the data collected from studies 1 
and 2, permanent indebtedness is a prominent 
characteristic of the population of street vendors. In 
order to verify the effects of permanent 
indebtedness, a third and final study was conducted 
at both the Downtown and Santa Helena sites in 
March and April 2016. A newly structured survey was 
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designed by the authors to collect information about 
access to financial institutions and the extent of 
indebtedness of street vendors. 300 randomly 
selected street vendors were interviewed, 250 in 
Downtown and 50 in Santa Helena.  
In total, there is complete socioeconomic information 
on 639 street vendors in Cali (those who answered 
the questionnaire in the first and second study 
Downtown and in Santa Helena) plus additional 
information about indebtedness and access to 
banking services from a subsample of 300 street 
vendors. 
The socioeconomic information obtained in the first 
two studies was used to characterize the living 
conditions and business operation of street vendors. 
It was then merged with the data obtained in the third 
study to further examine their debt portfolio and 
access to regulated banking systems. In this context, 
the type of merchandise (e.g. watches) was used as 
a matching variable because on average, vendors 
report a similar monthly income based on the type of 
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goods they sell. The reported sales are used as a 
proxy for income. Total costs are the sum of 
merchandise cost (investment) and storage cost. 
Profit is the subtraction of income and total costs. 
These variables were calculated on a monthly and 
then daily basis. The values are reported in US 
dollars (1 US dollar equals 2,000 Colombian pesos). 
To estimate the indebtedness, an index was created. 
The “indebtedness index” is the daily amount to 
cover loans and interests (debt), divided by daily 
profit and multiplied by 100. The closer the index to 
100, the higher the indebtedness level (in some 
cases, when the profit is negative, this index is also 
negative). Finally, net income is defined as the 
subtraction of profit and debt. All calculations were 
made using Stata. We used descriptive statistics to 
conduct this analysis. 
IV. Results  
Table 1 presents part of the information gained about 
street vendors in Cali who work at the markets 
Downtown and in Santa Helena (study 1 and 2). As 
a reference value, it shows the equivalent data (if 
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available) of the average citizen, which derives from 
an employment and quality of life survey conducted 
by the national government and is restricted to the 
working age population in Cali.  
When comparing the data obtained at the two street 
vending sites in our first and second study, we can 
observe that the percentage of vulnerable population 
groups is higher in the Santa Helena market than 
Downtown, such as women (52% vs. 47%), 
minorities (blacks and indigenous; 32% vs. 22% and 
18% vs. 12% resp.), persons with disabilities (8% vs. 
6%) and victims of the armed civil conflict (the so 
called “displaced”) (23% vs. 14%). Furthermore, the 
average age is higher in Santa Helena (50 vs. 43 
years), and the educational level is lower in Santa 
Helena than Downtown (10% with high school 
diploma or higher educational level vs. 28%). The 
civil status of marriage and cohabitation (as an 
indicator of familiar stability) is more frequent in the 
Downtown market (54% vs. 47%), whereas the 
average number of children is equal (3 children). The 
street vendors at the Downtown site tend to work a 
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little longer (10.8 vs. 10.1 daily hours) and more 
frequently (6.6 vs. 6.1 days per week), but also have 
a slightly higher average income (USD464 vs. 
USD431) than in Santa Helena and are less likely to 
currently pay a loan (37% vs. 44%). On the other 
hand, the percentage of persons with more than 5 
years of professional activity as a street vendor is 
higher in Santa Helena (87% vs. 69%), as well as the 
percentage of street vendors located at the same site 
for more than 5 years (79% vs. 57%). 8 out of 10 
street vendors (but only 6 out of 10 debt-free street 
vendors) are economically responsible for their 
families. Interestingly, street vendors both with and 
without debt tend to live in neighborhoods with similar 
socioeconomic conditions and housing situation.  
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Table 1. Socioeconomic profile of street vendors in 
Cali4 
Source: Authors 
When comparing the information presented in table 
1 with the equivalent data of an average citizen of 
working age in Cali (if available), several differences 
stand out. First of all, the level of education is 
distinctly higher (67%) in the average population. 
                                                             
4 The calculation of income per hour is not relevant in the Colombian context 
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Secondly, the percentage of vulnerable groups, such 
as women (41%), minorities (blacks and indigenous; 
21% and 7% resp.) and persons with disabilities 
(2.6%) is lower. The average citizen also works less 
daily hours (8.5 hours) and fewer days a week (6 
days/week) and is younger (40 years). On the other 
hand, the income of the average population in Cali is 
noticeably lower (367USD) when compared with a 
street vendor Downtown or in Santa Helena. 
However, only 30% of the street vendors own a 
home, compared to 52% of the average population. 
Furthermore, merely 15% of the street vendors pay 
for their health insurance (non-subsidized), whereas 
69% use the subsidized public health system, and 
15% do not have any form of health insurance.  
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Table 2. Debt portfolio of street vendors 
Source: Authors 
Most street vendors buy supplies for their businesses 
on a daily or weekly basis (63% and 21% 
respectively) from wholesalers. This usually requires 
a direct full cash payment as there is no credit option. 
Around 38% of the 300 participants in our third study 
are currently in debt (113 in total; 93 of 250 
participants Downtown vs. 20 of 50 participants in 
Santa Helena), but 68% of them have been in debt in 
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the past year (64% Downtown vs. 90% in Santa 
Helena). The principal purposes of loans are 
investment in their businesses (71%) and paying 
back current debts (24%). Table 2 depicts the most 
interesting details of the debt portfolio, including the 
distribution of loans by lender, the average monthly 
interest rates of the different loans and the average 
time needed to pay the loan back. 
The main source of capital are payday loans (51.3%), 
followed by microfinances (23.9%) and credits from 
a bank (16.8%). A loan from a friend or family 
member is rather rare (3.5% and 4.4% respectively). 
When comparing the debt portfolio according to the 
vending site, we can observe that the percentage of 
payday loans of indebted street vendors in Santa 
Helena is distinctly higher than Downtown (65% vs. 
48.4%), whereas the percentage of microfinancing 
and credits from a bank is lower (20% vs. 24.7% and 
10% vs. 18.3% resp.). Interestingly, the average 
monthly interest rates of the above mentioned loan 
types are very similar for street vendors in Santa 
Helena and Downtown, with the only exception of 
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credits from a bank (2.3% vs. 3.8%). The average 
interest rate of a payday loan is comparatively high 
(20.4% and 20.3% resp.), followed by loans from a 
friend (10%). The interest rates of microfinancing and 
credits from a bank are considerably lower (2.3% vs. 
2.7% and 2.3% vs. 3.8% resp.). The average amount 
of time required to pay back a loan is over a year 
(13.1 months), which corresponds to a total interest 
rate of around 265% for a payday loan. However, the 
street vendors in Santa Helena need less time to pay 
off their debts than Downtown (9.7 months vs. 13.9 
months). The majority of street vendors (82%) does 
not have a bank account, which indicates no access 
to the formal banking system at all. When comparing 
street vendors with and without debt, the percentage 
of existing bank accounts is higher among the group 
with current debts (29% vs. 11%). 
Our results, as depicted in Table 3, show that only 
two products – vegetables and leather goods – 
generate total losses when looking at the mean value 
of profits. All the other products show a positive net 
income and beyond that an indebtedness index 
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below 35% with the only exception of CDs. Street 
vendors selling CDs have to spend, on average, 51% 
of their daily income on debts. The lowest 
indebtedness indexes could be calculated for phone 
accessories, watches and juices. The highest mean 
profits as well as the highest mean net income could 
be calculated for glasses, phone accessories and 
watches. The merchandise of phone accessories 
and watches seems most profitable. However, these 
products can only be found Downtown, not in Santa 
Helena. The highest indebtedness indexes could be 
calculated for CDs, fruits and herbs – apart from 
vegetables and leather goods with negative indexes 
due to a negative profit. However, we have to take 
into account the standard deviation of each 
calculated mean value for profit, debt and net 
income. This means that due to a high variation 
between daily gains and losses as well as the 
amount of debt between the individual street 
vendors, some of them might have a high profit 
whereas others register losses. 
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Table 3. Daily levels of indebtedness of street 
vendors 
Source: Authors 
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V. Discussion  
As in many other developing countries in Latin 
America, the informal sector of the Colombian 
economy still plays a significant role for a relevant 
part of the working age population and the national 
government, mostly due to scarce opportunities in 
the regulated job market and a low educational level. 
In our paper, we focus on street vending in Cali, the 
third largest city in Colombia. Cali is exemplary for an 
encounter of socially and economically vulnerable 
population groups, such as refugees from the armed 
civil conflict (the so called “displaced”) and certain 
ethnic groups. Apart from that, the educational level 
among the working age population shows major 
differences. This generates an environment of 
poverty and inequality which provides a basis for the 
emergence of the informal market. Given the nature 
of street vending, working conditions are particularly 
harsh and the income is rather unstable. In addition, 
there are connections between street vending and 
the mafia, smuggling, and other organizations that 
profit from tax evasion. 
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The results of our study show that, on average, street 
vendors are less educated than the general 
population in Cali and work longer, but they report 
higher incomes (above the minimum wage). 
Furthermore, they usually enjoy a double benefit 
from the government in terms of an untaxable income 
as well as free or subsided access to health care. But 
despite those benefits, street vendors do not save 
money, nor do they deposit it in a bank or make 
medium- or long-term investments due to a lack of 
access to formal financial markets. One indicator of 
savings and capitalization is house ownership which 
is significantly lower among street vendors as 
compared to the average citizen (30% vs. 52%). The 
exclusion from regulated financial markets increases 
the opportunity cost of saving (keeping cash at home 
can be risky) to the point that being in debt can be 
seen as a way to save (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). 
Furthermore, the limited access to mainstream credit 
increases the demand for moneylenders offering 
payday loans which in turn increases the overall cost 
of capital (Bhutta et al., 2015).  
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The debt portfolio of street vendors reveals that 
payday loans are their main source of capital, 
especially in Santa Helena. Contrary to the 
experience in some developed countries, street 
vendors in Cali do not use payday loans to overcome 
short term shocks, such as medical bills (Bickham & 
Lim, 2015). They generally rely on this kind of loan 
for their economic activities, such as purchasing 
merchandise or repaying other debts. The high 
interest rates of these loans and the time needed to 
repay them compound the poverty penalty 
shouldered by street vendors (Mendoza, 2011).  
There are significant differences between the 
individual street vendors considering their work area 
and merchandise. Street vendors in Santa Helena, 
primarily a food market, represent a more vulnerable 
population group than Downtown as there is a higher 
prevalence of minorities, handicapped and women, 
and the population is significantly elder and less 
educated. Moreover, Santa Helena vendors have 
been disproportionately affected by the armed 
conflict, and the market itself faces more crime than 
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Downtown, which increases the exposure to 
victimization. The average income is also slightly 
lower in Santa Helena and the proportion of vendors 
paying a loan is higher.  
As in previous studies about street vendors, we 
found that fruit and vegetable vendors are more 
vulnerable. Comparative studies of street vendors 
revealed profound inequalities within street vendors 
depending on the good they sell (Roever, 2014). One 
possible explanation is that vendors in food markets 
are subject to various commercial risks such as rising 
prices, unreliable supply chains, natural disasters 
and climate changes that affect food prices. Vendors 
in this sector may be unable to externalize rising 
costs to consumers because of intense competition 
and costumer bargaining. These factors may explain 
why vegetable vendors report a negative average net 
income in Santa Helena. 
Street vending is a short-term commercial activity 
that requires a constant cash-flow. Most street 
vendors buy merchandise from wholesalers on a 
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daily basis which demands an immediate cash 
payment. The day-to-day structure of street vending 
can explain the need for a high indebtedness ratio, 
because a higher monetary liquidity is needed when 
the investment is so frequent. Therefore, a 
substantial proportion of the income is absorbed by 
debt obligations. Even though an average street 
vendor earns 20% more than an average citizen in 
Cali, their apparently higher incomes are 
counterbalanced by an average level of 
indebtedness of 26% which implies that street 
vendors are not generally better-off than the average 
citizen. However, the high variation in the standard 
deviation for each calculated value for profit between 
the individual street vendors suggests that for some 
of them, street vending is a very profitable activity.  
Most street vendors (between 70% and 89%) have 
been working at the same location for more than five 
years even though they have been paying interest 
rates of up to 20% per month, which speaks for their 
debt repayment capabilities. However, the time 
frame characteristics of this market (day-to-day) and 
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criminality increase the opportunity cost of 
accumulating cash. Since withdrawals and deposits 
in a formal bank account in Colombia cost a fee, and 
credits from a bank usually admit only monthly 
repayments, the traditional financial obligations of the 
formal sector seem unattractive. Therefore, an 
affordable loan platform is needed. Nevertheless, 
this requires a government intervention. So far, the 
national and local government have concentrated on 
relocation strategies and permanent control of public 
space occupation. None of these approaches have 
been successful (Martinez & Short, 2016). The first 
step would be to recognize that street vending 
generates jobs and income for a population that is 
still excluded from formal markets. Furthermore, any 
policy intervention can only be effective if it takes into 
account the current structure of street vending as a 
day-to-day, cash-based activity. The lack of access 
to regulated banking services, which results in 
excessive interest rates of payday loans, stands out 
as a major problem and may be one cause of a 
perpetual indebtedness.  
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The government should develop a new policy 
strategy. The emergence of impact investors and 
their idea of achieving both social/environmental and 
financial returns can offer the capital needed to test 
innovative financial opportunities for street vendors 
(Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011; GIIN, 2016; 
Nicholls2010; Rivera Acevedo & Tellez, 2016). A 
loan platform based on the block-chain technology 
can reduce exponentially both the transaction cost 
and the information asymmetry of financial 
formalization, allowing street vendors to access 
loans at competitive rates (Aldane, 2016; Nakamoto, 
2009). Furthermore, an impact bond can be created 
to test the concept (Rivera Acevedo & Tellez, 2016). 
VI. Conclusions  
Our paper contributes to the understanding of the 
street vendors’ inability to overcome poverty despite 
their comparatively high income given their exclusion 
from regulated banking systems. The debt portfolio 
of street vendors reveals that their main source of 
capital is payday loans offered by moneylenders. The 
predatory interest rates of these loans 
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counterbalance the high-income benefits and 
maintain a vicious cycle of indebtedness, which is 
one of the main reasons why they are unable to 
capitalize on their earnings. However, street vending 
is a cash-based day-to-day activity which masks the 
high opportunity cost of loans and long-term deficits. 
Significant differences between individual street 
vendors can be seen, which are associated with their 
location and merchandise. According to our study, 
the street vendors located in Santa Helena represent 
a more vulnerable population group in terms of 
educational level, prevalence of minorities and 
indebtedness. Furthermore, they run a higher 
commercial risk due to the characteristics of a food 
market. 
The structure of the street vending business and the 
high cost of capital increases the poverty penalty for 
street vendors and prevents them from making long-
term investments. This means that despite their 
relatively high income, street vendors, especially in 
Santa Helena, are by no means better-off than the 
general population of Cali. A policy intervention is 
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highly recommended. The rising of impact investing 
and impact bonds in Colombia can offer the capital 
and the mechanisms necessary to establish an 
innovative outcome-based policy strategy. It is 
recommendable to use a block-chain-based 
technology to reduce the transaction cost and the 
information asymmetry of financial formalization.  In 
general, providing suitable access to regulated 
financial services could be a more effective strategy 
than the current approach of relocation and control of 
public space.  
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regulated institutions. Bank fees, transaction costs 
and lack of durable assets to back up indebtedness 
exclude the poor from the banking system and forces 
them to resort to moneylenders for credit at the cost 
of predatory interest rates. In order to assess the 
economic implications of payday loans, information 
about indebtedness was collected amongst the poor 
population in Cali, Colombia, with a focus on street 
vendors. A random sample of 300 street vendors was 
surveyed at two large street vending sites in the city 
in 2016. Respondents were inquired about income, 
expenses, household composition, and access to 
banking services, credit, and indebtedness. This data 
in brief presents the value of the gathered 
information, the general characteristics of this 
research and the methodology used. 
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Specifications Table 
Subject area Public Policy 
More specific 
subject area 
Microfinance   
Type of data Text, dummy and metric variables 
How data was 
acquired 
Survey data 
Data format Raw 
Experimental 
factors 
None 
Experimental 
features 
None   
Data source 
location 
Cali - Colombia 
Data accessibility Observatorio de Políticas Públicas – POLIS 
www.icesi.edu.co/polis/ 
Related research 
articles 
Martinez, L., Rivera-Acevedo, J.D: (2017). 
Debt portfolio of the poor: The case of street 
vendors in Cali, Colombia. Under evaluation.   
Value of the data 
• There is a lack of information about the link 
between poverty and access to regulated credit. The 
information gathered from this study allows an 
assessment of the economic consequences of credit 
in form of payday loans amongst the poor and 
contributes to a better understanding of this 
phenomenon. 
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• Data collected among street vendors, who 
despite their slightly higher income, are still 
vulnerable due to their instable work environment 
(Martínez, et al, 2017). Linking the information 
between poverty, income and lack of access to 
credit, allows a better understanding of different 
mechanisms that perpetuate poverty. 
• This data is highly relevant for policy making 
purposes. Most of the government interventions 
aimed at providing regulated credit to the poor have 
focused on microfinance loans. However, 
microfinance credits do not take into account the 
dynamics and behaviors of the poor in terms of 
savings and repayment capabilities. Most of the 
credit programs promoted by the government are not 
tailored for the needs of the poor. 
• Data from this study can be linked with several 
observable characteristics of informal workers like 
access to welfare programs and demographic 
information. By linking this data with broader studies, 
it will be possible to draft conclusions for larger 
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populations of workers in the informal economy at the 
bottom of the social pyramid. 
Data 
Information about the debt portfolios of the poor was 
collected in Cali, Colombia. Data were collected 
through a structured survey. Respondents consisted 
of 300 street vendors randomly selected at two street 
vending sites in the city. Field work was conducted 
between January and February 2016. 
Experimental Design, Materials and Methods 
Based on the information of the planning department 
of Cali, there are nine street vending sites in the city. 
Information presented in this analysis was collected 
at the two largest sites: Downtown and Santa 
Helena. The downtown site is located in the heart of 
the city where most of the government offices are 
situated. Here, street vendors occupy an area of 
about 13 blocks that containing a vast range of 
informal and formal activities. Santa Helena site is a 
food market that covers about 12 blocks. It is located 
next to an area with high criminal activity and lies in 
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the middle of an urban renovation plan by the 
government called the “green corridor”. Figure 1 
presents the locations where the field work was 
conducted. 
For data collection, the authors designed a structured 
survey (Figure 2). The questionnaire was piloted with 
street vendors at different sites than Downtown and 
Santa Helena to test the clarity of the questions and 
the general structure of the questionnaire. Trained 
pollsters collected the information alongside two field 
supervisors. Respondents were selected randomly 
and pollsters provided an explanation of the purpose 
of the study. Anonymity was guaranteed and it was 
made clear that the information would be used for 
academic purposes only. Participation was voluntary 
and respondents could stop the survey at any time. 
We collected 300 complete surveys. 9 respondents 
quit before the survey ended. 
Respondents were asked 66 questions about 
demographic information (age, gender, and 
education), indebtedness, income, expenses, the 
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products they sell, and expectations of their 
economic future. The uninterrupted survey took 
about 20 minutes, but since the participants usually 
continued their work it took about 40 minutes in most 
cases. 
This study follows local and international rules for 
empirical research. Likewise, respondents provided 
verbal consent before survey commencement. The 
survey did not inquire about personal information that 
allows the identification of any informant. Information 
about this study is available at: 
www.icesi.edu.co/polis/. 
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Figure 1: Field work locations: Street vending sites 
in Cali, Colombia. 
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Figure 2: Survey information. Indebtedness of the 
poor - Street vendors in Cali, Colombia 
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Abstract: 
The informal economy accounts for half of the 
economic activity in Colombia. Street vending is a 
major part of the informal sector. In the context of 
a rapid urbanization due to internal conflicts, low 
skilled workers find a last resort for income 
generation as street vendors. Even though studies 
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have revealed that street vendors can have high 
profits, they usually remain poor. A primary reason 
is their continuous indebtedness outside the 
regulated financial market. This paper proposes a 
comprehensive questionnaire survey on the 
socioeconomic profile of street vendors. This tool 
can be used to assess the individual credit risk and 
incentivize the financial inclusion of the poor. It can 
also be used for evaluation processes by the 
government or impact investors. 
Keywords: Colombia, Credit Risk, Impact 
Investing, Informal Economy, Microfinance 
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I. Introduction 
The informal economy in Colombia, like in many 
other countries in South America, accounts for 
about 50% of the economic activity (ILO, 2014). 
Within the informal sector, street vending 
constitutes an important share. As an economic 
sector, it is dynamic and provides goods and 
services to a large population. There is not enough 
accurate data to establish the number of street 
vendors in Colombia or their living conditions, but 
the information available shows that street vendors 
usually belong to the poor population and that low-
skilled jobs are their last resort of income 
generation (Donovan, 2008; Martínez et al., 2017). 
Due to the many intersections with poverty 
reduction, the low-skilled labor market and urban 
planning, street vending constitutes a relevant 
topic on the national and local policy agenda and 
is therefore an important area of research. 
Motivated by the significant role that street vending 
plays in the Global South, the authors have 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n3p41 
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undertaken several studies to understand the living 
conditions and the socioeconomic dimension of 
this occupation in Cali, Colombia (Martínez & 
Short, 2016; Martínez et al., 2017; Martínez & 
Estrada, 2017). It was found that street vendors 
report a higher income than the average citizen, 
but they are unable to capitalize on their earnings 
and escape poverty. The reason is a vicious circle 
of indebtedness and a high dependency on loan 
sharks (Martinez & Rivera-Acevedo, forthcoming). 
Nevertheless, street vendors show the financial 
capacity to pay back their debts. The assumption 
is that they would profit from access to credits from 
a bank or microfinance institution with lower 
interest rates, or other legal financial instruments. 
Until now, the policies that different local 
governments in Colombia have implemented to 
cope with street vending, such as relocating the 
vendors, have not worked. Intervention programs 
that consider the needs of street vendors are rare 
and vary from city to city (Martínez & Short, 2016). 
Social programs targeting informal workers, and 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n3p41 
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street vendors in particular, should also focus on 
strategies for financial inclusion. This aspect has 
not yet been taken into account by the 
government. The goal of this paper is to contribute 
with a tool that helps craft targeted interventions 
aimed at increasing the financial inclusion of 
informal workers. 
This study presents a survey with 62 questions on 
demographic aspects, employment and health 
care, household characteristics, income and 
expenses, access to the banking system and credit 
history. All the questions have been used and 
tested before by either the government, regulated 
financial institutions or the authors in previous 
studies, but are arranged in a new constellation for 
the purpose of this study. The results of the survey 
can be used to create a profile of the poor that 
discloses their financial status and reveals under 
which conditions they are creditworthy. This 
instrument of individual credit risk assessment can 
reduce information asymmetries and help include 
the poor population into the formal financial 
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market. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first 
section gives an overview of the urbanization 
process in Colombia, the role of the informal 
economy and the limited access of poor people to 
different legal financial institutions (e.g. bank, MFI). 
It also gives an overview of different mechanisms 
of financial inclusion in Colombia. The second 
section presents the suggested questionnaire 
survey to profile the creditworthiness of poor 
population groups. Afterwards, policy 
recommendations and alternative financial 
instruments are discussed in the third section, and 
conclusions are drawn in the fourth section. 
II. The informal economy and financial access 
in Colombia 
Latin America experienced a rapid urbanization 
between 1925 and 1975, rising from 25% to 61.2% 
of the population living in cities (Cerrutti & 
Bertoncello, 2003). Urbanization has contributed to 
reduce poverty and child mortality rates, and 
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increase human development indicators such as 
educational attainment (Christiaensen & Todo, 
2014). Colombia, as one of the major countries in 
the region (48 million inhabitants), experienced the 
same transformation. Nowadays, about 75% of the 
population in Colombia lives in cities (DANE, 
2015a). There are three populous cities in the 
country: Bogotá (7 million), Medellin (2.5 million) 
and Cali (2.4 million). 
Cali is an economic hub in the Pacific region. It is 
located in the department of Valle del Cauca, 
which contributes to about 4.1 percent of total GDP 
in the country (Banco de la República, 2013). Most 
of its economic activity has derived from sugar 
cane production and other agricultural activities. 
One of the major drives of population growth in Cali 
is rooted in the armed conflict. In 1990, the city had 
only about 1.7 million inhabitants, and the large 
population growth experienced in the last decades 
is partially due to the resettlement of displaced 
people (Poveda, 2011). These migration flows 
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have aggravated inequality, increased poverty and 
restrained economic opportunities for poor people. 
It is estimated that about 25% of the city population 
lives in poverty (DANE, 2013). 
The Colombian government stratifies 
neighborhoods and households according to 
access to public services. This stratification is a 
mechanism to classify households based on their 
living and socioeconomic conditions. The strata 
scale goes from one to six: one and two are 
classified as poor; three and four represent the 
middle class; five and six are classified as rich 
(DNP, 1997). 
For most poor people (strata 1 and 2), an 
economic activity in the informal sector is the last 
resort to earn a living. In Colombia, the informal 
economy covers a wide range of activities, from 
garbage collectors to street vendors and owners of 
small companies (ILO-FORLAC, 2014). Given the 
heterogeneity of this sector and the lack of reliable 
data, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of the 
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informal economy. However, official statistics 
report that about half of the population in Colombia 
earns a living with an informal occupation (DANE, 
2015b). People who work in the informal sector are 
characterized by the lack of a sufficient skill set to 
find employment in the formal sector, unstable 
working conditions and vulnerability to economic 
slowdowns due to an insufficient social protection 
system (Gaspirini & Tornarolli, 2007). 
Another important characteristic of the informal 
sector is the exclusion from formal economic 
structures like banking (Chen, 2005, 2012). 
Informal workers do not have access to credit by 
regulated financial institutions given their lack of 
collateral and/or employment stability. 
Traditionally, banks grant large loans to clients with 
a low credit risk which allows a low transaction cost 
per dollar lent and a high probability of repayment. 
Lending to the poor is not attractive for traditional 
financial institutions because of the high 
administrative cost, lack of deposits and low 
revenues (Serrano-Cinca & Gutierrez-Nieto, 
DOI:10.5539/res.v10n3p41 
262 
 
2014). The exclusion from formal financial services 
pushes the poor towards informal credit markets, 
such as payday-loans or moneylenders, who 
charge predatory interest rates (Mallick, 2012). 
Despite certain limitations, the main resource of 
formal credit for people at the bottom of the 
pyramid are microfinance institutions (from now on 
MFIs) (Banerjee et al., 2015; Weiss & 
Montgomery, 2005; Quinones & Remenyi, 2014). 
The literature offers a mixed picture regarding 
MFIs. On the one hand, some researchers claim 
that microcredits do not only increase income and 
consumption, but also have a positive impact on 
the quality of life of the borrowers (Swain, 2012). 
On the other hand, it is argued that high interest 
rates and unethical collection methods may 
compromise this positive effect of credit 
accessibility to the poor (Kar & Swain, 2014). 
Contrary to traditional businesses, the strong 
social principles of some MFIs drive them to find 
“difficult” customers instead of focusing on their 
most profitable customers (Serrano-Cinca et al., 
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2015). It is important to point out that loans to the 
poor have repayment rates of 97% (Ashta, 2009). 
However, in environments with large information 
asymmetry, borrowers tend to take multiple loans 
from different MFIs (also known as double-dipping) 
and combine them with loans from moneylenders 
which leads to inefficiencies and ultimately default 
(Guha & Chowdhury, 2013; Mallick, 2012). 
Microcredits have a high transaction cost which 
translates into high interest rates for the poor. The 
interest rates demanded by MFIs are the result of: 
losses due to loan impairment, profits (or re-
investments for NGOs and non-for-profit MFIs), 
cost of capital and cost of screening, monitoring 
and enforcing small loans (Armendáriz & Morduch, 
2010; Kar & Swain, 2014; Roberts, 2013). The 
administrative cost of microloans can go up to 40 
percent of the loan size (Braverman & Guasch, 
1989). This creates a bias towards short-term 
production cycle investments, such as petty retail, 
where borrowers can follow tight repayment 
schedules soon after the loan is granted (Dalla 
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Pellegrina, 2011). Furthermore, different 
borrowers face different transaction costs, but the 
lack of information blocks the opportunity to offer 
loans which are tailored to the needs of individual 
borrowers (Guha & Chowdhury, 2013). In 
Colombia, the maximum interest rates demanded 
by MFIs are regulated by the government. At the 
time of this research, the cap for microcredits is 
4.58% per month (Superintendencia Financiera de 
Colombia, 2017). 
Moneylenders have the same kind of transaction 
costs as MFIs (screening, monitoring and 
enforcing small loans), but demand higher interest 
rates due to the illegal nature of moneylending 
(about 20% per month). But they are more 
convenient than MFIs in terms of accessibility and 
cash-flow. For example, a worker enforcing a loan 
for an illegal moneylender requires a higher wage 
than an employee in an MFI because wages 
include the opportunity cost of potentially being 
incarcerated.  
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Apart from MFIs, some cities Colombia are 
exploring different mechanisms sponsored and/or 
regulated by the government that provide credit 
access for the poor. One mechanism is through 
utility companies (operated by the government or 
private investors). Two examples stand out. The 
first one is called “Brilla” and covers several 
regions in the country. This program is operated by 
a private gas company. After revising the clients’ 
payment history, the company offers clients with 
good credit records the opportunity to use a line of 
credit to buy durable assets such as appliances. 
Clients pay the quote of the durable asset plus their 
monthly gas bill. More recently, this line of credit 
was opened for educational programs using a 
multilateral bank loan (Trochez, 2014; IADB, 
2017). Following this business strategy, the public 
services company of Medellin (EPM) offers credit 
cards, microfinances and also open credit lines for 
home improvements and investments such as 
household expansions and renovations (EPM, 
2017). The second strategy, also implemented in 
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Medellin, is “Banco Oportunidades”. The program 
has been implemented since 2013 and is possibly 
the most comprehensive intervention that provides 
credit to the poor in the country. It has credit lines 
for microfinances, educational loans and 
cooperatives, and has a targeted program for 
street vendors. The interest rate is usually below 
market value (0.91% per month) and individuals 
who have been reported as risky-borrowers in 
credit score databases by formal financial 
institutions can access small loans equivalent to 
about a minimum monthly salary (Alcaldía de 
Medellín, 2017). 
Other emerging methods of financial inclusion of 
the poor are peer-to-peer lending and impact 
bonds. Peer-to peer lending brings together non-
institutional borrowers and lenders. Borrowers 
upload their business plan on a specialized 
website and lenders decide under which terms 
they are willing to provide the requested capital 
(Mild et al., 2015). In this context, individual 
investors bear the credit risk instead of financial 
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institutions specialized in risk-management 
(Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015). As many loans are 
not secured, only the estimated return of the 
productive activity can be expected. Currently, the 
opportunity cost of investment on peer-to-peer 
platforms is high since the investors’ risk is still not 
fully compensated (Mild et al., 2015). 
Impact bonds are an impact investment vehicle. 
Impact investing refers to investments that deliver 
measurable social/environmental returns along 
with financial profits (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 
2011; Nicholls, 2010; Ormiston et al., 2015. Impact 
bonds are an outcome-based policy-making 
strategy in which private investors receive a rate of 
return if pre-agreed social/environmental 
outcomes are achieved (Liebman, 2011; Rivera-
Acevedo, 2015). At the time of this research, 93 
impact bonds are being implemented, including 
one in Colombia (Social Finance UK, 2017). This 
instrument shows great potential in the area of 
poverty alleviation through financial inclusion 
combining seed capital, savings, skills training, 
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coaching, confidence-building and social support 
(Instiglio, 2017). 
III. Assessing the credit risk of street vendors 
Population data in Colombia –as in many other 
countries in Latin America- is scarce. In general, 
cities lack reliable and timely information about the 
living conditions and socioeconomic status of the 
inhabitants, as it is not continually collected by 
local administrations. This is usually due to a lack 
of funding as well as an absence of evaluation 
culture which restricts an informed policy-decision- 
making process. The last population census was 
collected in 2005. Even though the central 
administration has implemented different 
population surveys since, these are mostly 
representative of smaller regions 
(“departamentos”). 
Information about banking and access to credit is 
not available at city level and is not collected 
systematically by the central government. 
According to reports by the Colombian financial 
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union association (“ASOBANCARIA”), about 26 
million of Colombians have had access to at least 
one banking service by 2017. Most of those 
services are referred to saving accounts and only 
54% of those services were used at least once in 
the past 6 months (El Tiempo, 2017). This 
information, however, does not disclose the 
socioeconomic background of the customers and 
says little about the financial inclusion of the poor. 
One effort made by the government to introduce 
the poor to the regulated banking system was to 
make mandatory saving accounts for the deposit 
of money from “Familias en Acción” (FA). FA is one 
of the largest welfare programs in Colombia. It 
gives bi-monthly cash transfers to mothers in strata 
1 and 2 based on their age and number of children. 
The precondition of a bank account has been 
implemented since 2010 and currently, over 2.5 
million families are beneficiaries of this program 
(Prosperidad Social, 2017). 
Access to formal financial institutions is expensive. 
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In Colombia, it is necessary to open a bank 
account when employed in the formal sector. 
Salary bank accounts require at least a handling 
fee. The cost of this handling fee is only marginal if 
receiving a salary deposit once or twice a month. 
In the informal sector, pay-day jobs such as 
domestic work, construction or street vending are 
common and do not have access to salary bank 
accounts as they cannot guarantee a reliable 
income. The option of a saving account is given, 
but it involves a handling fee plus a fee and waiting 
time for every withdrawal and deposit. In that 
regard, the day-to-day structure of street vendors 
increases the opportunity cost of banking as it is a 
short-term commercial activity that requires a 
constant cash-flow and instant cash payment since 
merchandise is usually purchased from 
wholesalers on a daily basis (Martínez & Rivera-
Acevedo, forthcoming). 
In a previous analysis, the authors found that the 
average monthly income of a street vendor is 20% 
higher than the income of an individual in the same 
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socioeconomic strata with more education, and 
also higher than the income of an average middle 
class individual in the city (Martínez et al., 2017). 
But despite their higher income, street vendors are 
unable to capitalize on their earnings through 
durable goods like a household. 38% of individuals 
in strata 1 and 2 own a house, whereas only 28% 
of street vendors report the same asset (ibid). A 
possible reason explaining the inability of street 
vendors to capitalize on their earnings and move 
out of poverty is their high indebtedness rate with 
payday-loans (Martínez, Rivera-Acevedo, 
forthcoming). Their major source of credit are 
illegal moneylenders. This is due to their lack of 
access to regulated banking services and legal 
credit because of generally high transaction costs 
and a high level of information asymmetry. 
An information asymmetry is present when one 
party has more or better information than the other. 
In terms explained by Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970), 
lenders face adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Adverse selection is present because 
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the lender does not know if the project is good or 
not (or if the street vendor is capable of selling the 
products). Moral hazard is present because the 
lender does not know if after receiving the loan, the 
borrower will successfully realize the project or if 
after the project succeeds, the borrower will pay 
back the loan plus the interest. The best way to 
reduce information asymmetries is using outside 
rating firms and guarantees (Akerlof, 1970). 
However, the poor do not have any collateral and 
rating firms are too expensive. Therefore, a 
different approach is needed. 
Oh & Johnston (2014) studied the credit card 
market and proposed a pricing model for managing 
credit risk. The model consists of four factors that 
influence the consumer interest rate: Credit 
scoring, risk-based pricing, behavioral scoring and 
the relationship between the bank and the 
borrower. Credit scoring contains information 
regarding credit history, willingness to pay and 
ability to pay. Risk- based pricing takes into 
account credit reports, default risk, and group 
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pricing. Behavioral scoring comprises payment 
behavior and ‘‘through-the-door’’ (TTD) analysis, 
which includes factors such as education level and 
income status. The relationship factor consists of 
information regarding trust and the reliability of the 
information provided (see figure 1). This pricing 
model for credit cards can be adapted to a 
microloan context by also taking into account that 
the factors explaining default on peer-to-peer loans 
are the purpose of loans, annual income, current 
housing situation, credit history and indebtedness 
(Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015). 
As a result of previous studies by the authors, one 
of the major hypothesis of this present study is that 
risk borrowers with a long history of unregulated 
credit sources (such as payday-loans) pay back 
their debts and that therefore their repayment 
capacity is high. However, given the unregulated 
nature, transactions in the moneylending business 
are not officially recorded and cannot be taken into 
account for formal lending purposes, even though 
this additional information can help build a more 
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accurate profile of a risk borrower. 
Figure 1: Pricing decision model 
 
Source: Adapted from (Oh & Johnston, 2014) 
In order to determine the profile of a risk borrower, 
a set of 62 questions was created concerning the 
economic capabilities of the poor (see annex 1). 
These questions are a tool to reduce information 
asymmetries between financial organizations and 
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lenders who do not comply with lending standards 
set by regulated financial institutions. Some of the 
questions are widely used by national and local 
governments to target social welfare beneficiaries 
and identify spending priorities to support the poor. 
Other questions have been used by regulated 
financial institutions or the research center POLIS 
of the University ICESI in Cali. As in other studies 
by the authors, the questionnaire survey is 
designed to be taken by pollsters. 
The proposed borrower risk profile is divided into 
five components: i) demographic information; ii) 
employment and health; iii) household conditions; 
iv) income and expenses; v) access to banking 
services and indebtedness (see figure 2). 
The section of employment and health accounts 
for three aspects. First, questions taken from 
national surveys implemented by the central 
government collect information about employment 
and sector (formal or informal). A second set of 
questions explores the quality of employment, e.g. 
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hours worked, benefits besides salary, 
employment satisfaction and employment stability. 
All the questions included in this component have 
been tested in Cali in extensive population 
surveys. Thirdly, this section accounts for the 
perceived health condition, which is a key proxy of 
productivity. 
The component household conditions are mostly 
drawn from national surveys that assess basic 
needs in households such as sanitation conditions, 
access to potable water and building structure. 
These surveys have been widely implemented in 
Latin America and at the national level. The 
statistical agency of the country (DANE) has 
designed and tested composite indicators to 
determine a household’s unmet basic needs 
(Feres & Mancero, 2001). This study follows the 
methodological guidelines implemented by the 
government to establish the extent of unmet needs 
amongst risk borrowers. 
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Figure 2. Credit Risk Assessment for People at 
the Bottom of the Pyramid (see annex) 
 
Source: Authors 
The questions in the income and expenses 
component are a simplified version of the ones 
used in official surveys by the government, given 
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the low educational attainment of our target 
population. This section inquires about access to 
welfare programs and retirement programs 
contributions. The questions have been tested in 
previous studies with poor populations such as 
garbage collectors (Estrada, et al., 2017) and 
street vendors (Martínez et al., 2017). 
The section about access to banking services and 
indebtedness inquires about credit history, type of 
loaner (moneylender, MFI, bank) and interest rates 
in current and past loans. All the questions in this 
section have been tested with street vendors in 
Cali (Martínez & Rivera-Acevedo, forthcoming). 
Information collected with this survey, serve the 
purpose of creating a lending risk profile of the 
poor and reduce the information asymmetries that 
lenders have to sort out for lending to informal 
workers. The profile risk that is created with the 
information collected through this survey is one of 
the main inputs for implementing programs that 
promote financial inclusion. 
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IV. Discussion and policy implications 
The informal economy in Colombia is a relevant 
and interesting research topic. The informality and 
its consequences in general, as well as the 
economic activity of street vending in particular, 
are of high priority for policy-makers. 
The internal armed conflict caused the relocation 
of farmers from rural areas to the cities. The 
sudden influx of people without the necessary 
skills to thrive in urban areas segregated them into 
economic activities in the informal sector. This 
sector is characterized by unstable working 
conditions, vulnerability to economic cycles and a 
lack of access to formal financial institutions. Street 
vending represents an important part of the 
informal sector. It is a cash-based day-to-day 
activity that requires a constant money flow. 
Without access to formal financial institutions, 
street vendors turn to illegal moneylenders for the 
necessary cash to run their business. 
Street vendors in Cali have the financial capacity 
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to pay back their debts, but are trapped by 
moneylenders and payday-loans. They have a 
higher income than the average working age 
citizen, especially other individuals classified as 
poor by national standards who work in the formal 
sector and have higher levels of education. 
Nevertheless, they are not able to capitalize on 
their earnings and remain cataloged as poor 
(strata 1 and 2) because the interest rates 
demanded by moneylenders absorb their profits 
(interests rates can reach up to 20% interest per 
month). An alternative to moneylenders are MFIs 
offering credits at comparatively lower interest 
rates but the access is limited. 
The current policies implemented by the 
government of Cali to cope with informality and 
street vending in particular have not shown the 
desired outcomes. Therefore, the proposed tool 
aims at reducing information asymmetries to 
incentivize the financial inclusion of the poor. The 
borrower risk profile based on the questionnaire 
survey with five components offers a 
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comprehensive overview of the needs and re-
payment capabilities of the poor. However, data 
collection is expensive. Nevertheless, this task 
could be carried out by official entities of the city. 
So far, the different government offices that 
operate social programs in Cali using public 
resources do not have a standardized format to 
characterize the beneficiary population. They often 
collect irrelevant information. Furthermore, their 
instruments usually do not draw conclusions about 
the living conditions of the beneficiaries, and even 
less about access to credit and indebtedness. The 
advantages of data collection through government 
offices are as follows. First, the government can 
rely on timely standardized information about the 
living conditions of the poor with access to public 
social programs. Second, it would provide the 
opportunity to craft better targeted programs for 
credit access. Thirdly, it would save the 
government money because the data collection 
could be carried out at the same time as the 
mandatory update of the program participants. 
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This questionnaire, besides providing the basis to 
determine the socioeconomic profile of the poor, 
can also become a useful tool for the government 
for evaluation purposes, incentivizing the practice 
of data-based policies. 
Individual profiles can increase the flexibility in loan 
disbursement and repayment schedules as well as 
reduce the overall transaction cost of microloans. 
Profiles can be categorized in a rating which can 
be easily accessible to financial institutions, 
including MFIs and banks. These ratings can also 
reduce double-dipping and diminish the 
transaction costs related to loan due diligence, 
especially for MFIs. As discussed by Mallick 
(2012), individual profiling can enhance investment 
productivity, even more so, if loans are combined 
with skills training, coaching, confidence-building 
and social support as in the case of impact bonds. 
The proposed risk profile can also be used by 
impact investors. Granting credit access to people 
at the bottom of the social pyramid can be a 
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profitable business. One of the major challenges of 
impact investing is to provide measurable 
social/environmental impact. In this context, the 
questionnaire gives a clear overview of the quality 
of life of the borrowers which can be used as a 
baseline to measure the impact of microcredits on 
users. Furthermore, a private company could use 
the questionnaire and develop a rating to sell it to 
the government, peer- to-peer platforms, banks, 
and MFIs, similar to traditional credit score 
databases. In addition, a utility company in Cali 
could develop a program similar to “Brilla” in which 
beneficiaries have access to credit as well as 
savings. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper presents a comprehensive 
questionnaire survey that covers five essential 
components of living conditions, such as financial 
status including different aspects of indebtedness. 
It is designed to be taken by trained pollsters, e.g. 
employees of the local government offices. The 
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target group is the population at the bottom of the 
social pyramid in Colombia, but could be adapted 
to other countries in the Global South. The results 
of the questionnaire can be used as an instrument 
for credit risk assessment that takes into account 
the financial activity of an individual in the formal 
and informal sector. This could facilitate the 
inclusion of the poor in the regulated banking 
system, where credits can be obtained at a much 
smaller interest rate and under secure conditions. 
In general, the survey can be used as an effective 
tool for the government to develop outcome-based 
policies. According to the findings of the survey, 
the government can implement targeted social 
programs that reduce poverty and increase the 
quality of life of the citizens. The outcome of these 
projects can be measured with the same 
questionnaire. Since Colombia has a rare practice 
of data collection, this would foster an evaluation 
focused culture. A further option to apply the 
survey can be the impact investing market as a 
complement to traditional banks or MFIs. The most 
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interesting financial instruments in this sector are 
impact bonds and peer-to-peer lending, which also 
comprise aspects like skill training and coaching. 
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Annex 1. Figure 1. Credit Risk Assessment for 
People at the Bottom of the Pyramid 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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Annex 2. Survey - Credit Risk Assessment for 
People at the Bottom of the Social Pyramid
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